



Sudan: Query Response

Inter-communal violence in West Kordofan; Cattle-raiding in West and South Kordofan; The ability of the State authorities to prevent and protect victims or would-be victims in West and South Kordofan

20th September 2016 (COI up to 15th August 2016)

West and South Kordofan COI Query Response

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Explanatory Note

This report presents country of origin information (COI) on West and South Kordofan up to 15th August 2016 on issues for research identified to be of relevance in refugee status determination for Sudanese nationals. Only COI specific to West and South Kordofan has been included unless otherwise stated. For information on the situation in South Kordofan more generally, see the relevant sections of the ARC publication [South Kordofan and Blue Nile Country Report](#), 1 June 2016, whilst information on the situation in Sudan more generally can be found in the relevant sections of the ARC publication [Darfur Country Report](#), October 2015.

The COI presented is illustrative, but not exhaustive of the information available in the public domain, nor is it determinative of any individual human rights or asylum claim. All sources are publicly available and a direct hyperlink has been provided. A list of sources and databases consulted is also provided, to enable users to conduct further research and to conduct source assessments. Research focused on **events**, which occurred between 1st June 2014 and 15th August 2016 and all sources were accessed between June and August 2016. Sources pre-dating the cut-off point for research were included to provide background information where necessary. A range of spelling searches was conducted to research information on the various tribes and clans listed in this document.

To supplement the publicly available information included in sections 'A. Inter-communal violence in West Kordofan' and 'C. The ability of the State authorities to prevent and protect victims or would-be victims in West and South Kordofan', telephone interviews were conducted and email correspondence sought in July and August 2016 with country experts on Sudan, asking the following two questions:

- Does the inter-communal violence in West Kordofan take on a revenge killing/retaliatory aspect?
- Is the Sudanese state able to provide protection?

For a list of country experts consulted, a short paragraph on their expertise, and their contact details, see [Annex A](#) in this report.

It should be noted that as Human Rights Watch explained in a December 2014 report, "there has been little information about conditions in government-held areas in both states as Sudan has not allowed human rights investigators access".¹ As set out by the UN Secretary-General in his June 2015 report, "Access to Government and SPLM-N-controlled areas remained very challenging, even though there was a slight improvement compared with 2013. For the first time, the United Nations was granted limited access to Kurmuk and Bau localities in Blue Nile. Access to Abyei through Kadugli continued to be difficult".² Amnesty International similarly noted in an August 2015 report on attacks against civilians in Sudan's South Kordofan State that "International organizations have faced considerable difficulty in monitoring the human rights situation in the state because of sweeping restrictions by the Government of Sudan on access to the area. While it has been very difficult because of security concerns and logistical challenges related to travel, it has been possible to conduct some research in areas that are controlled by the SPLA-N, but it has been impossible to do so in areas under the control of the Sudanese Armed Forces. There has been scant media coverage

¹ Human Rights Watch, [Sudan: Soldiers, Militias Killing, Raping Civilians](#), 15 December 2014

² UN Secretary-General (UNSG), [Children and armed conflict: report of the Secretary-General](#), 5 June 2015, A/69/926-S/2015/409, paragraph 178

of the conflict over the past four years because of the ban on access and the security and logistical challenges associated with travel to and in the area”.³

This document is intended to be used as a tool to help to identify relevant COI and the COI referred to in this report can be considered by decision makers in assessing asylum applications and appeals. **However, this document should not be submitted in full or in isolation as evidence to refugee decision making authorities.** Whilst every attempt has been made to ensure accuracy, the authors accept no responsibility for any errors included in this report.

³ Amnesty International, [Don't We Matter? Four years of unrelenting attacks against civilians in Sudan's South Kordofan State \[AFR 54/2162/2015\]](#), 17 August 2015, *Restrictions on Human Rights Monitoring* p.38

List of sources and databases consulted

Additional sources to those individually listed were consulted via database searches. This non-exhaustive list is intended to assist in further case-specific research. To find out more about an organisation, view the 'About Us' tab of a source's website

Databases consulted:

[EASO COI Portal](#)

[ECOI.net](#)

[Refworld](#)

[Reliefweb](#)

Sources consulted

[Armed Conflict Location & Event Date Project \(ACLED\)](#)

[Aegis Trust](#)

[African Arguments](#)

[African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies \(ACJPS\)](#)

[Africa Review](#)

[All Africa](#)

[Amnesty International](#)

[Brookings Institution](#)

[Carnegie Endowment for International Peace](#)

[CHR Michelsen Institute](#)

[CIA World Factbook](#) – Sudan country page

[Doctors Without Borders](#)

[Eldis](#)

[Enough Project](#)

[Equal Rights Trust](#)

[Eric Reeves, Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy](#)

[Fund for Peace – Fragile States Index 2015](#)

[Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research](#)

[Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust](#)

[Human Rights Watch](#)

[Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan/Small Arms Survey](#)

[Institute for Economics & Peace – Global Peace Index 2015](#)

[Institute for War and Peace Reporting](#)

[Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre](#)

[International Committee of the Red Cross \(ICRC\)](#)

[International Crisis Group](#)

[International Federation for Human Rights](#)

[International Office for Migration Sudan Mission](#)

[International Refugee Rights Initiative](#)

[Inter Press Service](#)

[IRIN news](#)

[Jamestown Foundation](#)

[Nuba Reports](#)

[Oxfam](#)

[Radio Dabanga](#)

[Radio Tamazuj](#)

[Rift Valley Institute](#)

[South Kordofan Blue Nile Coordination Unit \(SKBLCU\)](#)

[Sudan Democracy First Group](#)

[Sudan Consortium](#)

[Sudan Social Development Organisation \(SUDO\)](#)

[Sudan Tribune](#)

[UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office](#)

[United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees \(UNHCR\)](#)

[United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs \(UNOCHA\)](#)– Sudan country page

[United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights \(OHCHR\)](#)

[United States Institute of Peace](#)

[United States Department of State](#)

[Waging Peace](#)

Issues for research

A. Inter-communal violence in West Kordofan

This section should be read in conjunction with '[B. Cattle-raiding in West and South Kordofan](#)' and especially '[3. Cattle raiding practices in Sudan](#)' as the COI suggests that most of the inter-communal violence is linked to access to (grazing) land and natural resources. For a more historical/anthropological account, Douglas H. Johnson, country expert on Sudan, suggested in his email correspondence with Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC) to include a reference to Ian Cunnison's book *Baggara Arabs: Power and the Lineage in a Sudanese Nomad Tribe* (Oxford, 1966), "which describes in some detail land use and rights, internal feuds, how they are composed, blood-money compensation, and the background to Humr/Misseriya relations with the government".⁴

For ease of reference, an administrative map of West Kordofan can be found [here](#).⁵

According to Al-Arabyia, during Sudan's 22-year civil war, which ended in 2005 and led to South Sudan's separation, the Misseriya tribe (and other groups) were armed by the Sudanese government.⁶ Reuters noted that "Arab tribes, many of which were armed by the government in Khartoum to help end an insurgency by mainly non-Arab rebels in Darfur, have turned their guns against each other in a surge of conflict over resources".⁷

In September 2014, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) found that "Inter-ethnic violence has been increasing steadily since early 2014, often linked to conflict over land and cattle. Clashes have involved Rizaygat, Maaliya, Hamar, Misseriya, Abala, Bani Hussein, and other groups in Darfur and West Kordofan [...] Reconciliation efforts have targeted specific groups, although intersecting ethnic and tribal dynamics may impede their effectiveness".⁸

Roudabesh Kishi, a post-doctoral research fellow at ACLED-Africa, wrote in January 2015 that the Misseriya ethnic militia continues to be "very active in Sudan (especially in Kordofan), and is the communal militia involved in the most inter-communal conflict-related fatalities in Sudan as a whole since the beginning of 2014".⁹ According to the same source "Amnesty International traces much of the inter-communal conflict in Sudan back to Sudan's failing economy, as much of this conflict between pastoralist and farming communities is seen as clashes over access to land as well as cattle. Oil also fuels this conflict, especially in oil-rich West Kordofan".¹⁰ The source further noted that:

Battles between these [ethnic] militias and government forces, however, occur in Kordofan (specifically, the Abyei region) as well as in the Northern region. Though at times these clashes are a response to government seizure of herdsman and livestock, these battles tend to arise as clashes between village residents and army recruits believed to be affiliated with political militias (such as the

⁴Douglas H. Johnson, country expert on Sudan in email correspondence with Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC) on 8th August 2016. See Annex A for more information.

⁵See UN OCHA, [Sudan: West Kordofan State Administrative Map \(January 2015\)](#), 17 January 2015

⁶Al-Arabya, [Over 100 dead in clashes in Sudan's Kordofan: tribes](#), 28 November 2014

⁷Reuters, [At least 133 killed in tribal clashes in Sudan - tribe leader](#), 27 November 2014

⁸Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), [CONFLICT TRENDS \(NO. 30\)](#) [REAL-TIME ANALYSIS OF AFRICAN POLITICAL VIOLENCE](#), SEPTEMBER 2014

⁹Roudabesh Kishi (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)), [Inter-communal Conflict in Sudan](#), 28 January 2015

¹⁰Roudabesh Kishi (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)), [Inter-communal Conflict in Sudan](#), 28 January 2015

Rapid Support Forces), or are due to army forces responding to communal militia attacks on civilians. [...]

The latter – civilian targeting by communal militias – occurs more widely geographically across the country. While these attacks occur largely in Darfur, they can be seen in Kordofan (specifically, the Abyei region) as well as in the Blue Nile region. They are primarily a result of inter-communal tensions (e.g., revenge attacks, cattle-raiding, etc.).

While much of the focus of conflict in Sudan, especially in Darfur, is on the civil war (battles between state military forces and rebels) and related violence at the hands of pro-government militias and paramilitary forces, violence involving communal militias continues to occur at a relatively high rate in Sudan (especially relative to past inter-communal conflict trends in the country), exacerbating the security situation in Sudan. Though reconciliation efforts have targeted specific groups, the intersecting ethnic and tribal dynamics have impeded their effectiveness.¹¹

Dr Harry Verhoeven, country expert on Sudan in a telephone interview with ARC on 19th July 2016 pointed out that framing the violence in West Kordofan as ‘tribal’ or ‘ethnic’ was not useful and obscures the real motives suggesting to name it ‘societal violence’ instead as it is “systemic, not a declared violence, often occurring on a daily frequency”.¹² According to Dr Harry Verhoeven the inter-communal violence in West Kordofan has more to do with political power, access to markets and most importantly access to livestock.¹³

In email correspondence with ARC, Douglas H. Johnson, country expert on Sudan, wrote on 8th August 2016 that “The cumulative effect of government policies in alienating land for mechanised farming schemes, the location of oil industry installations along grazing routes, and the failure to resolve the Abyei issue all have a bearing on why the Misseriya blame the [Sudanese] government for contributing to their internal feuds, and why state authorities themselves are part of the problem and unlikely to be reliable protectors of civilians”.¹⁴

According to Jago Salmon, country expert on Sudan in a telephone interview with ARC on 10th August 2016, historically the inter-communal violence in West Kordofan takes on a revenge killing/retaliatory aspect with a combination of factors leading to this violence: firstly, environmental factors (ie less grazing land and less rain) combined with structural/political factors (ie the fencing of oil fields), resulting in the disruption of traditional livelihoods, for example demarked migratory routes have become disrupted and the Misseriya tribes who migrate have to deviate from these routes and enter someone else’s grazing areas or fields of crops of agriculturalists thereby setting off local tensions. Moreover, with the reduction in unit return of having and/or selling cattle, more pastoralists find themselves poor or without cattle which leads to an increase in an unemployed and disempowered generation of young people who are more susceptible to violence and political power wrangling.¹⁵ Dr Harry Verhoeven, country expert on Sudan similarly confirmed that the inter-communal violence in West Kordofan takes on a revenge killing/retaliatory aspect and further stated that it had to be seen through its historical and political context: “that part of Sudan is extremely violent since independence and even before independence has always witnessed violence [...] the groups on the ground tend to be disproportionately heavily armed and I don’t just mean AK47 [...]”

¹¹Roudabesh Kishi (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)), [Inter-communal Conflict in Sudan](#), 28 January 2015

¹²Dr Harry Verhoeven, country expert on Sudan in a telephone interview with Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC) on 19th July 2016. See Annex A for more information.

¹³Dr Harry Verhoeven, country expert on Sudan in a telephone interview with Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC) on 19th July 2016. See Annex A for more information.

¹⁴Douglas H. Johnson, country expert on Sudan in email correspondence with Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC) on 8th August 2016. See Annex A for more information.

¹⁵Jago Salmon, country expert on Sudan in a telephone interview with Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC) on 10th August 2016. See Annex A for more information.

heavy weaponry, different types of artillery and heavily armed land-cruisers and ‘technical’ [...] and in this context the violence we see is seen as a legitimate mainstream political and social interaction”.¹⁶ He further added that the revenge attacks perpetuated are not the “Somalia type ‘you killed my brother so I kill your brother’” but are bigger than that and need to be placed in the context of a “heavily militarised state with West Kordofan being at the front line of so many conflicts within Sudan, at the border and used by Khartoum as a battleground to fight JEM [Justice and Equality Movement]”.¹⁷

Similarly, in a telephone conversation with ARC on 15th August 2016, a country expert on Sudan who wants to remain anonymous, noted that there are three sets of inter-communal violence in West Kordofan, two of which resulted in retaliatory killings between two sections of the Misseriya: one started in May 2011 and ended in January 2013, the second started in May 2014 and is still on-going despite attempts to settle the dispute, and lastly there is violence between the Misseriya and the Ngok Dinka in Abyei.¹⁸ The key issue for these three sets of inter-communal violence is ‘land’ noted the country expert, especially restrictions posed on migratory paths due to climate change, oil development, and new political arrangements and tensions between Sudan and South Sudan in the contested area of Abyei.¹⁹ According to the country expert three conflict areas exist in West Kordofan: in the east, which has an ethnic component and political as it links into the conflict between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM-N, internally amongst the Misseriya tribes, and to the South in relation to Abyei and the border with South Sudan, which taken together results in a “very volatile situation coupled with the availability of small arms”.²⁰ The country expert further explained that as historically West Kordofan “was a front line area during the long civil war” which resulted in locals increasingly being heavily armed with small arms, local conflicts and inter-communal dispute “can easily escalate”.²¹

Abdel-Rahman El-Mahdi, a country expert on Sudan, in providing written comments on 28th August 2016 specifically remarked regarding the revenge/retaliatory aspect of these inter-communal killings that:

The intertribal violence in West Kordofan has displayed aspects of revenge/retaliatory killings where sub-clans from the Misseriya tribe have repeatedly clashed with each other over land and land compensation disputes. These land disputes although present long before today have nonetheless become more acute and deadly following the discovery and exploitation of oil in the region of Kordofan. Following a number of deadly clashes between the sub-clans, local peace agreements brokered by the government have thus far failed to stem the killings between these clans. Travel across parts of West Kordofan is a dangerous affair and specific clan members can be signalled out at any time for retaliatory/revenge killings.

These revenge killings are further driven and sustained by local tribal culture where tribe members who do not avenge the death of a clan member are shamed within their community and their manhood affected. A man who does not avenge a family member from his clan would be a social

¹⁶Dr Harry Verhoeven, country expert on Sudan in a telephone interview with Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC) on 19th July 2016. See Annex A for more information.

¹⁷Dr Harry Verhoeven, country expert on Sudan in a telephone interview with Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC) on 19th July 2016. See Annex A for more information.

¹⁸Anonymous, country expert on Sudan in a telephone interview with Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC) on 15th August 2016. See Annex A for more information.

¹⁹Anonymous, country expert on Sudan in a telephone interview with Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC) on 15th August 2016. See Annex A for more information.

²⁰Anonymous, country expert on Sudan in a telephone interview with Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC) on 15th August 2016. See Annex A for more information.

²¹Anonymous, country expert on Sudan in a telephone interview with Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC) on 15th August 2016. See Annex A for more information.

outcast and forever shamed within his clan. Illiteracy and the spread of illegal small arms is another factor that continues to fuel violence and inter-tribal revenge killings in West Kordofan.²²

1. Armed conflict and peace negotiations between

a. the Falayta (al-Zyoud clan) and the Aajayra (Awlad Omran clan), sub-tribes of the Misseriya (Humur)

Note that various spellings are used in the sources included of what appears to be the same tribe of 'Falayta', 'al-Zyoud', 'Aajayra', 'Awlad Omran', 'Misseriya' and 'Humur'.

1 June – 31 December 2014

The Sudan Tribune reported that "283 tribesmen were killed and hundreds others injured in fighting that broke out between" Awlad Omran and al-Zyoud "over land dispute" in 2014.²³

In June 2014, Radio Dabanga reported that "At least 196 people were killed and injured in renewed clashes between warring clans of the Misseriya Humur [...] over a dispute about pastures [...] 70 people of the Awlad Imran were killed, and 70 were wounded. Of El Zyoud clan, 23 were killed and 36 wounded".²⁴

At the end of June 2014 Radio Tamazuj reported that "At least 35 people from the Zeyut and Awlad Omran clans of the Hamar Arab tribe were killed and several others wounded in renewed tribal clashes between the two clans [...] in Sudan's West Kordofan area".²⁵

Early July 2014 the Sudan Tribune reported that the Misseriya tribe "disclosed that 150 of its members were killed and another 100 injured in fighting that broke out between" two of its clans: Awlad Omran and al-Zyoud.²⁶ According to a local official, the fighting is due to the proliferation of arms among tribesmen, whilst "Mohammad Omar al-Ansari, a leading Misseriya figure, told the government sponsored Sudanese Media Center (SMC) website [...] that clashes between the two clans lasted a full day because of a dispute over land near the oilfields. He claimed that the conflict took place with the help of some outlaws from the two tribes and some of the South Sudan armed tribesmen, stressing that the Misseriya will sit down with the warring parties to press them to sign a treaty of peaceful coexistence".²⁷

Mid July 2014 the Sudan Tribune reported that "Awlad Omran and al-Zyoud clans of the Misseriya tribe have reached a truce following recent clashes which led to the death of more than 44 people. The head of the reconciliation and peaceful coexistence mechanism in West Kordofan state, Mohamed Jaber, said the joint committee of the traditional administration reached an agreement to stop armed fighting until holding the reconciliation conference".²⁸

²² Abdel-Rahman El-Mahdi, country expert on Sudan in email correspondence with Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC) on 28th August 2016. See Annex A for more information.

²³ Sudan Tribune, [Rival Misseriya clans sign reconciliation deal in West Kordofan state](#), 15 February 2016

²⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan's Misseriya clans clash again in West Kordofan](#), 29 June 2014

²⁵ Radio Tamazuj, [Hamar tribe infighting in West Kordofan](#), 30 June 2014

²⁶ Sudan Tribune, [Infighting among Misseriya tribe kills 150 in West Kordofan](#), 3 July 2014

²⁷ Sudan Tribune, [Infighting among Misseriya tribe kills 150 in West Kordofan](#), 3 July 2014

²⁸ Sudan Tribune, [Sudan: Govt Steps Up Tribal Reconciliations Efforts in Darfur, Kordofan](#), 15 July 2014

On 20th July 2014 Radio Dabanga further reported on reconciliation efforts between the two sub-tribes as follows:

A delegation from the Rizeigat tribe, headed by the former Governor of East Darfur State, Abdel Hamid Mosa Kasha, is leading an initiative to mediate between the Beni Imran and Ziyoud clans of the Misseriya. [...]

Abdallah Jamaa, member of the parliamentary reconciliation committee, told the press on Thursday that the delegation, consisting of MPs, former ministers, and representatives of the native administration, will travel next Monday to El Fula, capital of West Kordofan. They will also visit the conflict areas in El Dibab and Babanusa, and meet with the conflicting parties in an attempt to prevent escalation.²⁹

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA), basing its figures on the clashes that erupted in July 2014, reported that “conflict between the two Misseriya communities resulted in the displacement of 7,000 people from both tribes” and noted in December 2014 that “this previous caseload remains displaced”.³⁰

Radio Tamazuj reported in September 2014 that “Neutral corridors between the Awlad Omran and El Zeyud clans of the Misseriya El Humr tribe have been delineated in Babanusa town of West Kordofan state’, according to a source denying them access to Nama market”.³¹

In October 2014 Radio Dabanga reported that “The Awlad Omran and Zeyut clans of the Misseriya Humr tribe in Sudan’s West Kordofan signed a cessation of hostilities agreement [...] recommitted to respect a truce signed previously. Clashes previously erupted between the two clans over a piece of land that left more than 44 tribesmen dead”.³²

In November 2014 Al-Arabyia (English) reported that “more than 100 people have been killed in several days of fighting between two clans in Sudan’s oil-rich West Kordofan region”; clashes which began over a land dispute between the Zioud and the Awlad Amran groups.³³ The UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office reported in its December 2014 update that “During 28-30 November [2014], clashes between rival clans of the Misseriya tribe in West Kordofan reportedly led to 156 deaths and 183 injuries. Photographs circulated after the violence suggested numerous human rights violations may have been committed”.³⁴ The UN Secretary-General reported that the tribal fighting in November 2014 resulted in “at least 40 children” who were reportedly killed or injured”.³⁵

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA) reported in its December 2014 ‘Humanitarian Bulletin’ that “The UN is working with the Government of Sudan’s Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) in West Kordofan to undertake an inter-agency assessment mission to areas affected by fighting between two Misseriya sub-clans during the last week of November [2014]. HAC estimates that approximately 14,000 people have been displaced and may require humanitarian

²⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan: Initiative to Reconcile Misseriya Clans in West Kordofan](#), 20 July 2014

³⁰ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, [Humanitarian Bulletin; Sudan; Issue 50; 8 - 14 December 2014](#), 14 December 2014

³¹ Radio Tamazuj, [Feuding clans of Misseriya tribe denied access to Nama market](#), 11 September 2014

³² Radio Tamazuj, [Misseriya Humr clans sign truce in West Kordofan capital](#), 20 October 2014

³³ Al-Arabya, [Over 100 dead in clashes in Sudan’s Kordofan: tribes](#), 28 November 2014

³⁴ UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), [Sudan - Country of Concern: latest update 31 December 2014](#), 21 January 2015

³⁵ UN Secretary-General, [Children and armed conflict, Report of the Secretary General](#), 5 June 2015, paragraph 173

assistance”.³⁶ Radio Dabanga reported that “a notable from the area” held the “central government responsible for the renewed fighting among the clans of a single tribe”.³⁷

Reporting on the November 2014 clashes, Radio Dabanga noted that “Three days before, a reconciliation conference between the Awlad Imran and El Ziyoud clans was concluded in En Nahud”.³⁸ According to the same source, “The reconciliation conference between the Misseriya Humur clans [...] was supposed to be the final one, after the parties signed a cessation of hostilities agreement in El Fula town, by recommitting themselves to respect a previous truce in late October”.³⁹ A Misseriya leader “holds the speakers, the local government and other members of the conference responsible for the renewed tribal fighting. ‘During the conference, they did not discuss the basic issues between the clans,’ A lack of discussions about the tribal populations on the ground and the causes for fighting between them in the past did not lead to a comprehensive solution, Abuk believes. He claimed that ‘the government does not care about the tribes murdering each other’”.⁴⁰

2015

Radio Dabanga reported on 6th March 2015 about a “number of people” being wounded following “clashes between the Shanabla and Gemesat tribes in Wad Banda locality in West Kordofan state”, with one policeman killed after trying to intervene.⁴¹

On 23rd March 2015, Radio Tamazuj reported about renewed clashes between Awlad Omran and Al-Ziyoud clans “at Kilo 13 area in West Kordofan State”, which “was made as a buffer zone after a peace conference recently, a local source said”.⁴²

In June 2015 leaders of the Awlad Umran met in Abyei locality, where they discussed the issue of repeated conflicts over pastures, formulated a number of recommendations, and renewed their commitment to the peace agreement with the Zuyoud tribe, reported Radio Dabanga.⁴³

In July 2015 Radio Dabanga reported that the West Kordofan Security Committee discussed a proposed schedule for the migration of nomads with their livestock, to prevent tribal clashes in the area.⁴⁴

In September 2015 Radio Tamazuj reported that “local authorities in Sudan’s West Kordofan State announced they have received a written document from the feuding Ziyoud and Awlad Omran clans of the Misseriya tribe in which they expressed their willingness to hold a reconciliation conference”.⁴⁵ Governor of West Kordofan, Abul-Gasim Al Min Baraka stated that he had formed a number of committees to convene the peace conference between the two tribes in October 2015, according to the same source.⁴⁶

³⁶ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), [Humanitarian Bulletin; Sudan; Issue 50; 8 - 14 December 2014](#), 14 December 2014

³⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan: 'More Than 150 Killed' in West Kordofan Tribal Clash](#), 28 November 2014

³⁸ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan: 15 Die in New Misseriya Clan Clash in West Kordofan](#), 24 November 2014

³⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan: 15 Die in New Misseriya Clan Clash in West Kordofan](#), 24 November 2014

⁴⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan: 15 Die in New Misseriya Clan Clash in West Kordofan](#), 24 November 2014

⁴¹ Radio Dabanga, [Policeman killed in West Kordofan tribal clash](#), 6 March 2015

⁴² Radio Tamazuj, [Sudan: Fresh clashes between feuding clans in West Kordofan](#), 23 March 2015

⁴³ Radio Dabanga, [West Kordofan to secure nomad movement](#), 27 July 2015

⁴⁴ Radio Dabanga, [West Kordofan to secure nomad movement](#), 27 July 2015

⁴⁵ Radio Tamazuj, [Feuding Misseriya clans calls for peace meeting in West Kordofan](#), 28 September 2015

⁴⁶ Radio Tamazuj, [Feuding Misseriya clans calls for peace meeting in West Kordofan](#), 28 September 2015

In November 2015 Radio Tamazuj reported that “A peace and reconciliation committee in Sudan’s West Kordofan state has asked local authorities to release members of the Ziyoud and Awlad Omran clans of the Arab Misseriya tribe who were arrested this month by security forces. The state government deployed a security force to create a buffer zone between the two feuding tribes in the state [...] Adam Agidat, the head of the peace and reconciliation committee [...] pointed out that the request was accepted by the governor”.⁴⁷

1 January – 15 August 2016

Radio Tamazuj reported in January 2016 and quoted a local chief from the Missiriya tribe as stating that the “running feud” between the Awlad Omran and al-Zeyut clans is “in part due to a lack of resources”, in particular lack of pasture which has worsened since the separation of South Sudan as it has prevented cattle from crossing to the South.⁴⁸ The same source further reported, quoting the same local chief from the Missiriya tribe: “a peace conference that was due to take place in ad-Daien town” between the Awlad Omran and al-Zeyut clans “has been postponed several times, but he noted tha [sic] consultations are ongoing ahead of the planned event. The local chief said the two parties have worked out most of the issues, but did not disclose which issues they have agreed on”.⁴⁹

On 15th February 2016 the Sudan Tribune reported that “Two clans of the Misseriya tribe, Awlad Omran and al-Zyoud Monday have signed a reconciliation document in West Kordofan state following mediation efforts led by a local committee from the Rizeigat tribe”.⁵⁰ According to Radio Dabanga, the reconciliation committee decided that:

the 'blood money' for one victim will be SDG30,000 (nearly \$5,000) to be paid in four instalments. The compensation to be paid for the treatment of the wounded will be carried out after the completion of the medical reports.

The committee also stipulated a fine of SDG50,000 (\$8,160) and imprisonment for one year on ‘whoever stirs conflict again by talking about what happened’”.⁵¹

Radio Tamazuj reported on 19th February 2016 that at least four people were killed two of which from the Awlad Surur clan of the Missriya tribe and two from the Zeyoud clan, in an attack by unknown assailants.⁵²

On 13th July 2016 Radio Dabanga reported that armed members of the Misseriya tribe “clashed in West Kordofan”, without specifying to which clan these members belonged.⁵³ The same source further reported that gunmen had opened fire on a group of nomads 3km west of Lagawa, who returned fire, resulting in the killing of four persons and wounding four more.⁵⁴ According to Abdallah Tutu, a representative of the reconciliation’s committee in Lagawa, “the case of the accident goes back to an old retaliation between the two groups”, pointing out that “here was a great tension in the area, upon which the Lagawa security committee dispatched a police force in anticipation of an eruption of violence. There have been frequent reports about the gathering of

⁴⁷Radio Tamazuj, [Mediation committee calls for release of arrested Misseriya in W Kordofan](#), 24 November 2015

⁴⁸Radio Tamazuj, [Sudan: Chief blames lack of pasture for feud between Misseriya clans](#), 27 January 2016

⁴⁹Radio Tamazuj, [Sudan: Chief blames lack of pasture for feud between Misseriya clans](#), 27 January 2016

⁵⁰Sudan Tribune, [Rival Misseriya clans sign reconciliation deal in West Kordofan state](#), 15 February 2016

⁵¹Radio Dabanga, [Sudan: Misseriya Clans Sign Peace Treaty in East Darfur](#), 21 February 2016

⁵²Radio Tamazuj, [4 dead after attack by unknown assailants in West Kordofan](#), 19 February 2016

⁵³Radio Dabanga, [Tribal fighting in West Kordofan and Central Darfur](#), 13 July 2016

⁵⁴Radio Dabanga, [Tribal fighting in West Kordofan and Central Darfur](#), 13 July 2016

relatives of both parties from Abu Zabad”.⁵⁵ The UN OCHA ‘Humanitarian Bulletin’ covering 27 June-3 July 2016 reported that “The Abu Zabad area has recently witnessed tension and conflict between residents and pastoralists due to a chronic shortage of water; UNICEF plans to install two hand pumps in Abu Zabad to address the water shortages”.⁵⁶

i) Background information on the Misseriya (Humur) tribe

The Christian Michelsen Institute⁵⁷ provided the following background information regarding the Misseriya tribe:

The people who are known today by the transliterated name “Missiriyae” are cattle herding “Baggara” groups. There are five Missiriyae groups in the Sudan, each of them used to be led by of a Nazir, (native administration leader/ paramount chief) prior to the 1970s. They include, in Kordofan, the Humur (A’jaira and Falaita) and Missiriyae-Zurg as well as Missiriyae-Nittaiga and Missiriyae-Jabal in Darfur. Missiriyae groups in Kordofan used to pursue a predominantly pastoral nomadic form of livelihoods throughout the 19th. Century. From the 1920s onwards they got gradually transformed to semi-nomadic/agro-pastoralist forms of livelihoods due to the introduction of cotton cultivation and collection of Gum Arabic, the two main cash crops.⁵⁸

The Small Arms Survey provided the following additional information on the Misseriya tribe:

The Misseriya are organized into two main sub-groups, the Humr and the Zuruq. The Humr are centrally concerned with Abyei and the annual migration through the territory. The Humr are divided into two main sections, called gabily: the Ajaira and the Felaita. The Ajaira and the Felaita are also then split into units, which are also referred to by the Humr as gabily, although they are also called omodiya—an administrative term referring to a group under one ‘omda. The Ajaira are composed of the Fayarín, Awlad Kamil, Mezaghna, Fadliya, Menama, and ‘Addal, while the Felaita are composed of the Metanin, Ziyud, Awlad Serur, Jubarat, and Salamat.⁵⁹

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) further noted that:

Misseria is an Arab ethnic group in mainly Chad and the Kordofan region of Sudan. Their main livelihood consists of herding camels. The Misseria do not have their own Dar (homeland) but have been given land in the Dar of the Birgid, one of the largest non-Arab groups in Southern Darfur. They speak the Tama language and both originate and are otherwise largely concentrated in Chad. They are led by a nazir, paramount tribal chief, by the name of al-Tijani Abd al-Qadir. [...] In 2005, when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) brought the North-South war to an end, the Misseria clans were neither disarmed nor assisted in reintegrating into civilian life. Few of these were even compensated for their service in Southern Sudan. Being mostly illiterate and unemployed, this led many to resort to banditry, including occupying land, owned by non-Arab groups, by force of arms.

⁵⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Tribal fighting in West Kordofan and Central Darfur](#), 13 July 2016

⁵⁶ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), [Humanitarian Bulletin; Sudan; Issue 27; 27 June – 3 July 2016](#), 3 July 2016

⁵⁷ The CHR. Michelsen Institute (CMI) is an “independent development research institute in Norway. With a staff of 70 people, we address issues that shape global developments and generate knowledge that can be used to fight poverty, advance human rights, and promote sustainable social development”. See CMI, [Who we are](#), Undated [last accessed: 10/08/2016]

⁵⁸ Christian Michelsen Institute, [Failed governance and political turbulence in Abyei Area of Sudan](#), 2015, Introduction, Footnote 7

⁵⁹ Small Arms Survey, [Dividing lines: Grazing and conflict along the Sudan– South Sudan border](#), July 2013, Footnote 112

The Awlad Omran clan has been involved in the non-state category of the UCDP [Uppsala Conflict Data Program]organised violence.⁶⁰

The same source, elsewhere on their website, further clarified that “The main livelihood of the Misseria consists of herding. Some sections of the Misseria herds camels whilst other sections herds cattle. In Darfur the Misseria do not have their own Dar (homeland) but have been given land in the Dar of the Birgid, one of the largest non-Arab groups in Southern Darfur. A section of the Misseria annually go southwards in the Abyei area with their cattle in search of water and grazing”.⁶¹

According to Al-Arabyia (English), the Misseriya is “one of the biggest Arab tribes in Kordofan, and its clans are mostly nomadic cattle herders”.⁶² The United States Institute of Peace, reporting on the situation in Abyei which is located in the southern part of West Kordofan noted that “Misseriya nomads of Arab descent and from the north also inhabit the area for part of each year, and they have patrons in Khartoum”.⁶³

In 2014, the leader of the Misseriya tribe was named as “Mukhtar Babo Nimr” according to the New York Times⁶⁴ and Reuters⁶⁵ though the BBC reported that he was “one Messiriya leader”⁶⁶.

ii) Background information on the Falayta sub-tribe and its main clan the Zuyud

The Small Arms Survey provided the following additional information on the Falayta sub-tribe:

The Missiriya are organized into two main sub-groups, the Humr and the Zuruq [...] The Humr are divided into two main sections, called gabily: the Ajaira and the Felaita. The Ajaira and the Felaita are also then split into units, which are also referred to by the Humr as gabily, although they are also called omodiya—an administrative term referring to a group under one ‘omda. The Ajaira are composed of the Fayarín, Awlad Kamil, Mezaghna, Fadliya, Menama, and ‘Addal, while the Felaita are composed of the Metanin, Ziyud, Awlad Serur, Jubarat, and Salamat.⁶⁷

iii) Background information on the Aajayra sub-tribe and its main clan the Awlad Omran

The Small Arms Survey provided the following additional information on the Aajayra sub-tribe:

The Missiriya are organized into two main sub-groups, the Humr and the Zuruq [...] The Humr are divided into two main sections, called gabily: the Ajaira and the Felaita. The Ajaira and the Felaita are also then split into units, which are also referred to by the Humr as gabily, although they are also called omodiya—an administrative term referring to a group under one ‘omda. The Ajaira are

⁶⁰ Uppsala Conflict Data Program, [Actors: Awlad Omran clan](#), Undated [Last accessed: 08/06/2016]

⁶¹ Uppsala Conflict Data Program, [Actors: Misseriya](#), Undated [Last accessed: 08/06/2016]

⁶² Al-Arabya, [Over 100 dead in clashes in Sudan's Kordofan: tribes](#), 28 November 2014

⁶³ United States Institute of Peace, [Despite Violence, South Sudan Preparing for July 9 Independence](#), 1 July 2011

⁶⁴ The New York Times, [Sudan: Tribal Clashes Inflict Heavy Toll](#), 27 November 2014

⁶⁵ Reuters, [At least 133 killed in tribal clashes in Sudan: tribe leader](#), 27 November 2014

⁶⁶ BBC News, [Sudan clashes kill more than 100](#), 27 November 2014

⁶⁷ Small Arms Survey, [Dividing lines: Grazing and conflict along the Sudan– South Sudan border](#), July 2013, Footnote 112

composed of the Fayarin, Awlad Kamil, Mezaghna, Fadliya, Menama, and 'Addal, while the Felaita are composed of the Metanin, Ziyud, Awlad Serur, Jubarat, and Salamat.⁶⁸

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) noted that:

The Awlad Omran clan is a subgroup of the large tribe Misseria (alternative names: Missiriya, al-Misseriya, Misiriyya, Messeria, Misseriya). [...]

The Awlad Omran clan itself is mainly located in what was formerly the Western Kordofan region in Sudan, neighbouring to Darfur. As part of the Misseria tribe, the clan was armed by the Khartoum government's Military Intelligence to aid in the conflict against the SPLM/A (Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army) rebels in South Sudan during the 1980s. There, they were encouraged by the government to devastate communities with suspected ties to the SPLM/A. Known as the murahaliin (the roamers), these counterinsurgency militias were not paid by the government but were instead permitted to keep anything they looted such as cattle, household items, and even women and children. [...]

The Awlad Omran clan has been involved in the non-state category of the UCDP [Uppsala Conflict Data Program] organised violence.⁶⁹

Radio Dabanga noted in July 2015 that Ismail Hamedein is the leader of the Awlad Umran tribe.⁷⁰

b. theAwlad Sibeh and El Jamaniya clans of the Hamer tribe

Note that various spellings are used in the sources included of what appears to be the same tribe of 'Awlad Sibeh', 'El Jamaniya' and 'Hamer'.

In May 2016 Radio Dabanga reported on a "A five-hour gun battle [...] between tribal clans northeast of El Nahud in West Kordofan" which "left 38 dead and many wounded".⁷¹ The same source stated that "Witnesses told Radio Dabanga that the clashes erupted [...] after the killing of eight people from both parties in disputes over cattle" the previous week.⁷² Similarly, Radio Tamazuj reported that the two clans clashed "reportedly over cattle raid of al-Jammanea by Awlad Subaih month [sic] ago".⁷³

According to witnesses the Sudanese government sent "a military force to separate the two sides", which the Governor of West Kordofan, Abdul Gasim, confirmed, stating that "the army and the police intervened and contained the situation", Radio Dabanga reported.⁷⁴ According to Radio Tamazuj "Faisal Hassan Ibrahim, Sudan's national minister of federal governance and representative of the presidency, [...] issued directives for collection of guns within 72 hours from the feuding Jamaniya and Awlad Sabieh clans in West Kordofan state".⁷⁵

⁶⁸ Small Arms Survey, [Dividing lines: Grazing and conflict along the Sudan– South Sudan border](#), July 2013, Footnote 112

⁶⁹ Uppsala Conflict Data Program, [Actors: Awlad Omran clan](#), Undated [Last accessed: 08/06/2016]

⁷⁰ Radio Dabanga, [West Kordofan to secure nomad movement](#), 27 July 2015

⁷¹ Radio Dabanga, [38 dead in West Kordofan tribal clash](#), 19 May 2016

⁷² Radio Dabanga, [38 dead in West Kordofan tribal clash](#), 19 May 2016

⁷³ Radio Tamazuj, [37 killed in clashes between Al-Hammer clans in West Kordofan](#), 20 May 2016

⁷⁴ Radio Dabanga, [38 dead in West Kordofan tribal clash](#), 19 May 2016

⁷⁵ Radio Tamazuj, [Sudan president orders disarmament of Jamaniya, Awlad Sabieh clans in W Kordofan](#), 23 May 2016

c. the Awlad Shibek and Awlad Arafa clans of the Misseriya tribe

Radio Tamazuj reported in January 2016 that “one person was killed and several injured in inter-communal clashes between Awlad Shibek and Awlad Arafa clans of the Misseriya tribe in Kharasana area”.⁷⁶

d. the Hamar and Ma’aliya tribes

Note that various spellings are used in the sources included of what appears to be the same tribe of ‘Hamar’ and Ma’aliya’.

Note also that the Ma’aliya tribe regularly clash with the Rizeigat tribe in East Darfur, information of which can be found in ARC’s [Darfur Country Report](#), October 2015.

Radio Dabanga reported in July 2014 that “military forces have been deployed in localities of East Darfur and West Kordofan to serve as a buffer between Hamar and Ma’aliya warriors. Renewed clashes between the tribes, prompted by a conflict over farmlands erupted on 30 June [2014 in] East Darfur. The fighting, in which heavy weapons were used, led to the death and injury of at least 60 people from both sides”.⁷⁷ Similarly, Agence France-Presse reported in July 2014 that “battles’ between the Hamar and Ma’aliya groups “armed with machineguns and rocket-propelled grenades have left up to 22 people dead in a border region of Darfur”, with unrest spilling into adjacent West Kordofan state, “‘because some cows were stolen’ said a Hamar tribal leader”.⁷⁸

Radio Dabanga noted that violent confrontations between these two tribes have been continuing for two years [2012-2014].⁷⁹ Agence France-Press noted in July 2014 that “Over the past two years, as Sudan’s economy weakened, inter-communal clashes over resources have intensified in Darfur, a February report by United Nations chief Ban Ki-moon said. Government-linked tribal militias have become involved in those conflicts, he said”.⁸⁰

In mid-July 2014 Radio Tamazuj reported that “Representatives of the warring Hamar tribe of Kordofan and Ma’aliya tribe of East Darfur signed an agreement” and “agreed to participate in a reconciliation conference”.⁸¹ Leaders of the two tribes agreed further that “native administrators of both tribes will make efforts to intervene early in problems, to solve them peacefully, before they develop into clashes”.⁸²

Radio Dabanga reported in September 2014 that “leaders of the Hamar and Ma’aliya tribes signed a reconciliation agreement in El Fula, West Kordofan” following “fierce clashes that erupted in East Darfur and West Kordofan in April [2014]”.⁸³ According to the same source the “warring parties agreed to pay compensation for the losses sustained, which Babiker Ahmed Digna, Minister of Interior Affairs of West Kordofan described as a “unique model for reconciliation agreements”.⁸⁴ The

⁷⁶Radio Tamazuj, [Two people killed at football club in West Kordofan village](#), 9 January 2016

⁷⁷Radio Dabanga, [Hamar, Ma’aliya sign agreement in Omdurman, Sudan](#), 13 July 2014

⁷⁸Agence France-Presse, [Sudan tribal militia battles kill up to 22](#), 2 July 2014

⁷⁹Radio Dabanga, [Hamar, Ma’aliya sign agreement in Omdurman, Sudan](#), 13 July 2014

⁸⁰Agence France-Presse, [Sudan tribal militia battles kill up to 22](#), 2 July 2014

⁸¹Radio Tamazuj, [Kordofan and Darfur tribes sign ceasefire in Omdurman](#), 13 July 2014

⁸²Radio Tamazuj, [Kordofan and Darfur tribes sign ceasefire in Omdurman](#), 13 July 2014

⁸³Radio Dabanga, [Hamar, Ma’aliya reach agreement in Sudan's West Kordofan](#), 29 September 2014

⁸⁴Radio Dabanga, [Hamar, Ma’aliya reach agreement in Sudan's West Kordofan](#), 29 September 2014

Deputy Governor of West Kordofan, Prof. Abdel Rahman Mohamed Ali, “stressed that the agreement signed between the two tribes will lead to security and stability” and “called on the oil companies operating in West Kordofan and East Darfur to provide employment opportunities for young tribesmen”, reported Radio Dabanga.⁸⁵

e. the Shanabla and Gemesat tribes

Radio Dabanga reported that early March 2015 “a number of people were wounded in clashes between the Shanabla and Gemesat tribes in Wad Banda locality in West Kordofan state”, whilst “one policeman who tried to intervene between the combatants was killed”.⁸⁶ According to the same source, “witnesses revealed that [...] the authorities sent a large army force at Um Girenat area to disengage and separate the combatants”.⁸⁷

f. the Misseriya and Nuer tribes

Note that various spellings are used in the sources included of what appears to be the same tribe of ‘Misseriya’ and ‘Nuer’.

In February 2015 Radio Tamazuj reported that:

Local sources have reported fresh inter-communal clashes on Tuesday in the border area between South Sudan’s Unity state and West Kordofan state in Sudan. The clashes reportedly involve the pastoralist Arab tribe of the Misseriya and the Nuer tribe.

Mohamed Adam Wad Abuk, a Misseriya tribal leader, told Radio Tamazuj that a group of cattle raiders from the Nuer tribe in Unity state came and took cattle from them, prompting fierce fighting between the two tribes.

He confirmed that the attack resulted in the killing of several people from the two sides. But he did not know the number of casualties during those clashes.

Wad Abuk pointed out that they managed to recover the cattle. Radio Tamazuj could not independently verify the claims.⁸⁸

At the end of February 2015, Radio Tamazuj noted that “dozens of cattle” raided by the Midderiya herdsmen in West Kordofan have been returned after being recovered in Bul Nuer territory of northwest Unity State.⁸⁹ The same source further noted that:

Mayom County Commissioner John Bol said that the cattle were raided from the Misseriya Awlad Umran tribe by a ‘small number of criminals’ hailing from both his county and neighboring Rubkona County on 9 February [2015]. The commissioner told Radio Tamazuj that he sent back 86 head of cattle after a delegation of Misseriya visited Mayom to discuss the issue.

On the other side, Hamdi Al Dodo, one of the emirs of the Misseriya tribe, confirmed that 70 to 80 cows have been returned to the Misseriya from Unity State, while stressing that the raiders had actually taken a far larger number of cattle that have still not been returned.

⁸⁵Radio Dabanga, [Hamar, Ma’aliya reach agreement in Sudan’s West Kordofan](#), 29 September 2014

⁸⁶Radio Dabanga, [Policeman killed in West Kordofan tribal clash](#), 6 March 2015

⁸⁷Radio Dabanga, [Policeman killed in West Kordofan tribal clash](#), 6 March 2015

⁸⁸Radio Tamazuj, [Nuer, Misseriya clash over cattle along Unity-Sudan border](#), 12 February 2015

⁸⁹Radio Tamazuj, [Nuer return dozens of stolen cattle to Sudan’s Misseriya](#), 26 February 2015

He said the returned cattle had been taken in a raid earlier this month in which 13 herders of the Misseriya Awlad Umran were reported killed in the Al-Dihin area, which is located east of Abyei and north of Unity State.

Speaking to Radio Tamazuj today, Hamdi claimed that more than 2,500 head of cattle were taken by the raiders from Al-Dihin area, while also denying that the perpetrators were common criminals. Instead, he said, the raiders are affiliated with the armed forces of South Sudan. The raiding party consisted of as many as 80 men, he noted [...]

The emir also reported that another cattle raid took place earlier this month against the Misseriya Mazagna, at a place called Khashkash. He said 450 cattle were taken in that raid".⁹⁰

In April 2015 Radio Tamazuj reported further that "Local authorities in Mayom County Commissioner in South Sudan's Unity State have yesterday recovered 53 head of cattle looted by some Nuer criminals from the Misseriya Arab nomadic tribe in Sudan's West Kordofan State [...] The cattle were looted by criminals from Mayom County on 15 March [2015], according to the official".⁹¹

g. the Rizeigat and Misseriya tribes

Note that various spellings are used in the sources included of what appears to be the same tribe of 'Rizeigat' and 'Misseriya'.

Note also that these two tribes usually clash in East Darfur, information of which can be found in ARC's [Darfur Country Report](#), October 2015. Information included in this sub-section only relates to clashes, which have been reported to spill-over into West Kordofan.

In December 2014 Radio Tamazuj reported that "Local sources have reported fresh inter-communal clashes [...] in the border area between East Darfur and West Kordofan states in Sudan. The clashes in the Klobbi area involve the pastoralist Arab tribes of the Misseriya and Rizeigat. Rizeigat tribe member Al Shartai Bashir Hamdi accused members of Misseriya of assaulting Rizeigat in Kobbi district [...] killing 4 people and injuring two others from the Rizeigat side [...] However, in the same context a Misseriya tribe member who preferred to withhold his name told Radio Tamazuj that a similar incident occurred also between a group of Rizeigat and another section of Misseriya near Gardud Marir district. He referred to the death of five Rizeigat and injury of three from the side of the Misseriya Fayareen".⁹²

Radio Dabanga reported that in January 2015 "the Rizeigat and Misseriya clashed several times near El Meram in West Kordofan, which reportedly resulted in 11 casualties".⁹³ According to the same source "Rizeigat and Misseriya leaders hold the Sudanese government responsible for the continuation of armed conflicts between the two tribes. Musa Hamadein, a Misseriya leader, briefly commented that the government 'is not serious about solving the problems between the two tribes'" whilst "The spokesman for the Rizeigat Council of Elders, Younes Farah, told Dabanga that the government 'did not fulfil its duties in enforcing security in the area'".⁹⁴ Bashir Hamdi, *omda* of the Rizeigat tribe in Abu Jabra locality of West Kordofan told Radio Tamazuj that he "blamed the clashes on lack of implementation of resolutions of the peace meeting held in Babanusa town in June 2013. 'The problem is from the native administration of the Misseriya tribe because the two sides sat down and agreed to pay blood money, but they failed to implement it,' he said. He called

⁹⁰Radio Tamazuj, [Nuer return dozens of stolen cattle to Sudan's Misseriya](#), 26 February 2015

⁹¹Radio Tamazuj, [Mayom authorities return stolen cows to Misseriya owners](#), 2 April 2015

⁹²Radio Tamazuj, [Fresh clashes between Misseriya and Rizeigat in West Kordofan](#), 30 December 2014

⁹³Radio Dabanga, [Rizeigat, Misseriya conference begins in West Kordofan](#), 15 September 2015

⁹⁴Radio Dabanga, [Seven dead in new Rizeigat-Misseriya clash in West Kordofan](#), 27 January 2015

on the two governors of East Darfur and West Kordofan states to put pressure on the native administration of the two warring tribes to pay the blood money agreed upon during the Babanusa meeting. 'If the native administration refused, then the government should take action by jailing tribal leaders,' he emphasized.⁹⁵

At the end of January 2015, Radio Tamazuj reported that "At least two herders from the Misseriya Arab tribe have been killed in fresh clashes with the Rizeigat nomadic tribe at El Gardaya southwest of El Meiram town in West Kordofan state, a Misseriya leader said. Suleiman El Sharif told Radio Tamazuj that elements from the Rizeigat tribe attacked their cattle camp killing two herders and five cows. He denied claims by members of the Rizeigat tribe that the two victims were cattle raiders".⁹⁶

In April 2015 Radio Tamazuj reported that "At least 11 people were killed and several others wounded in fresh clashes between Misseriya and Rizeigat Arab tribes in the border between Sudan's East Darfur and West Kordofan states".⁹⁷ The same source further noted that "Rizeigat tribal leader Al Shartai Bashir Hamdi accused members of Misseriya of assaulting them [...] at Duraba, Farsaya", whilst the "Misseriya tribal leader Sharif Mohamed said that they were attacked at Duraba [...] He told Radio Tamazuj that the attack took place after a committee comprised of three people from the Misseriya was sent to recover stolen goats from the Rizeigat tribe".⁹⁸

2. Impact on the civilian population: humanitarian situation and internal displacement in West Kordofan

1 June – 31 December 2014

IOM stated in its 'IOM Sudan Humanitarian Summary 2014' that it received reports of 23,453 IDPs/Affected Population in West Kordofan⁹⁹, whilst UNHCR noted that "Access to West Kordofan State (Sudan) [sic] limited by security situation".¹⁰⁰

In June 2014 UN OCHA's 'Humanitarian Bulletin' reported that:

In West Kordofan state, an estimated 67,000 displaced people in Meiram, El Salam and Ghubaysh localities, and approximately 33,000 refugees from South Sudan in Babanusa and Muglad localities, are in urgent need of humanitarian aid according the Government's Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) and humanitarian actors.

According to a recent joint HAC/inter-agency mission, displaced people and refugees in Meiram, Muglad and El Debab localities are in urgent need of food and emergency household items, as well as health, nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene support. The communities hosting these people are also in need of humanitarian assistance, according to the mission. The mission observed that the South Sudanese who arrived since January 2014 have not received any humanitarian assistance, while an estimated 10,400 internally displaced people have received emergency food assistance. Line ministries and national organisation on the ground are unable to meet the needs of the people without more support from UN agencies, the mission reports [...]

⁹⁵ Radio Tamazuj, [Rizeigat leader blames Meiram clashes on native administration](#), 15 January 2015

⁹⁶ Radio Tamazuj, [Sudan: Two Misseriya tribesmen killed southwest of Meiram](#), 28 January 2015

⁹⁷ Radio Tamazuj, [Fresh clashes between Misseriya and Rizeigat tribes](#), 7 April 2015

⁹⁸ Radio Tamazuj, [Fresh clashes between Misseriya and Rizeigat tribes](#), 7 April 2015

⁹⁹ IOM, [IOM Sudan Humanitarian Summary 2014](#), Undated [Last accessed: 09/06/2016]. See also map produced by OCHA/IOM and UNHCR: OCHA/IOM/UNHCR, [Population Movement in Sudan 2014](#), Undated [Last accessed: 09/06/2015]

¹⁰⁰ UNHCR, [UNHCR Global Report 2014](#), 1 June 2015, *South Sudan Situation 2014*

Currently UN agencies operate from South Kordofan's Kadugli town, making the coordination and monitoring of projects in West and North Kordofan states difficult.¹⁰¹

In August 2014 IRIN reported that "Conflicts in [...] West Kordofan, have disrupted livelihoods and reduced household food access, especially for IDPs, while the persistent rise of staple food prices has reduced household capacity to meet minimum food requirements during the peak of the lean season when households are most market dependent".¹⁰²

UN OCHA's 'Humanitarian Bulletin' of September 2014 noted that:

An estimated 53,500 people affected by violence and conflict over resources in West Kordofan are in need of humanitarian assistance, according to the Government's Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) in West Kordofan. Humanitarian actors and Government authorities in the area lack sufficient resources, including staff, to meet these needs. The assistance provided comes primarily from humanitarian actors in South Kordofan, but this assistance is inadequate given the number of people affected. According to HAC, violence in the state has displaced 12,720 people to Babanusa town and El Udaiyat village; 21,000 people to Debab village and Muglad town; and 11,500 people to El Salam locality. There are also an additional 7,400 displaced people in Ghubaysh locality who fled conflict in North Darfur as well as 873 South Sudanese refugees in the Kharasana area.¹⁰³

In December 2014, UN OCHA's 'Humanitarian Bulletin' reported that:

The UN is working with the Government of Sudan's Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) in West Kordofan to undertake an inter-agency assessment mission to areas affected by fighting between two Misseriya sub-clans during the last week of November. HAC estimates that approximately 14,000 people have been displaced and may require humanitarian assistance. Media reports have said that 133 people were killed during the clashes, which are reportedly over the control of land. HAC have said that assessment missions and peace-building initiatives will take place once the security situation in the affected areas has stabilised. In July 2014, conflict between the two Misseriya communities resulted in the displacement of 7,000 people from both tribes. This previous caseload remains displaced.¹⁰⁴

2015

According to IOM's 'Displacement Tracking Matrix' the total number of registered IDPs between January to October 2015 was 143,760, of which 4,685 IDPs were in West Kordofan.¹⁰⁵ IOM continued to report in its 'IOM Summary Humanitarian Summary 2015' that "Access in West Kordofan remains limited, causing the South Sudanese to move on due to lack of sustained assistance".¹⁰⁶

1 June – 15 August 2016

In April 2016 Radio Dabanga reported that "Residents who live in rebel-controlled areas in West Kordofan are prohibited from doing shopping at the Lagawa market. Bakers in El Muglad started a

¹⁰¹ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), [Humanitarian Bulletin; Sudan; Issue 24; 9 - 15 June 2014](#), 22 September 2014

¹⁰² IRIN, [Food security alarm for east, central Africa](#), 13 August 2014

¹⁰³ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), [Humanitarian Bulletin; Sudan; Issue 38; 15 - 21 September 2014](#), 22 September 2014

¹⁰⁴ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), [Humanitarian Bulletin; Sudan; Issue 50; 8 - 14 December 2014](#), 14 December 2014

¹⁰⁵ IOM, [IOM Sudan – Displacement Tracking Matrix, January-December 2015](#), Undated [Last accessed: 09/06/2016]

¹⁰⁶ IOM, [IOM Sudan Humanitarian Summary 2015](#), Undated [Last accessed: 09/06/2015]

strike against the reduced flour quota on Sunday. Earlier this week, the security forces in Lagawa prevented residents from Tulushi, Tema, and Wali from purchasing basic necessities, medicines, and gasoline from the market, under the pretext of their presence in areas controlled by the SPLM-North. In addition, the security authorities have rationed the amount of consumer goods through issuing market permits in Lagawa [...] In January [2016], people in West Kordofan witnessed a lack of bread for days when the flour distribution company failed to send the required flour quota for the month".¹⁰⁷

On 14th August 2016 the UN OCHA's 'Humanitarian Bulletin' reported that "Heavy rain and flooding since early June [2016] have affected an estimated 161,700 people, destroyed about 14,700 houses and damaged another 10,800 homes in many parts of Sudan, according to the Government of Sudan and partners", including in West Kordofan where as of 15th August 2016 there were 14,340 flood-affected people and deaths.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ Radio Dabanga, ['Difficult to obtain food' in West Kordofan](#), 5 April 2016

¹⁰⁸ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), [Humanitarian Bulletin; Sudan; Issue 33; 8 - 14 August 2016](#), 14 August 2016

B. Cattle-raiding in West and South Kordofan

3. Cattle-raiding practices in Sudan

In July 2013 a working paper authored by Joshua Craze and published by the Small Arms Survey¹⁰⁹, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, sets out the importance of grazing along the Sudan-South Sudan border in which South Kordofan is located:

Almost two years after South Sudan became Africa's newest nation-state, its border with Sudan is neither delimited nor demarcated [...]

At issue for both states are oil reserves in the border region, as well as some of the most fertile land in the two countries. The border region also contains crucial grazing areas for transhumant and pastoralist groups, which traditionally agreed flexible grazing arrangements between themselves long before discussions began about a national border dividing their territory.¹¹⁰

Exploring the dynamics of the “emergence of a national border into a complex environment containing many groups with different histories and narratives” through five case studies including Unit-South Kordofan border and the Upper Nile-South Kordofan border, the same source found that:

- Grazing agreements are no longer simply between two local communities. Instead, the primary guarantor of migrant safety is the SPLA, and Northern migrants coming to the South must now first interact with the relevant state administrations. This reorientation of grazing agreements towards statelevel government and the army has tended to lessen the bonds of community coexistence; given that the SPLA is the main group from whom migrants need to be protected, it has also undermined the efficacy of grazing agreements.
- All along the border, there is confusion about which administrative levels should organize grazing routes [...] Taxation of migrant groups is similarly disaggregated between different actors, leading to confusion and anger between pastoralist groups and host communities.
- In some places along the border, relations between migrants and host communities have broken down to such an extent that only government intervention keeps grazing routes open. In other places, inter-community relations are relatively healthy, and it is government intervention that has militarized the border, and made trade and migration more difficult.
- Prior to South Sudan's secession, cross-border relations were marked by a degree of reciprocity: Northern pastoralist groups and their herds came south in the dry season, while Southern migrant labourers went north. There is now asymmetry along the border, as Northern pastoralists still seek to enter the South, but, due to harassment in Sudan, far fewer Southerners travel north for work.
- The border is highly militarized by a plethora of armed actors [...] Although most grazing agreements made by Southern host communities and Northern pastoralists insist that no weapons should be carried across the border, pastoralists generally remain in possession of small arms when in South Sudan. They report extensive harassment by the SPLA. In a climate of general uncertainty, it is highly unlikely that they will be convinced of the virtues of disarmament in the near future.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹The Small Arms Survey is “a global centre of excellence whose mandate is to generate evidence-based, impartial, and policy-relevant knowledge on all aspects of small arms and armed violence. It is the principal international source of expertise, information, and analysis on small arms and armed violence issues, and acts as a resource for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and civil society. It is located in Geneva, Switzerland, at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies”. See Small Arms Survey, [About the Small Arms Survey](#), Undated [last accessed: 17/08/2016]

¹¹⁰Joshua Craze, [Dividing lines: Grazing and conflict along the Sudan-South Sudan border](#), July 2013, Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, *Executive Summary*

¹¹¹Joshua Craze, [Dividing lines: Grazing and conflict along the Sudan-South Sudan border](#), July 2013, Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, *Executive Summary*

The report concluded that:

Security for Northern pastoralists is also now in the hands of the SPLA. During the 2011–12 grazing season, this yielded few benefits—the SPLA was responsible for most of the infractions against Northern pastoralists—but the SPLA’s role highlights the gradual removal of Southern host communities’ responsibility for Northern pastoralists, and the steady undermining of the mutual chains of obligation that previously made grazing agreements workable.

With the dominance of a state framework along the border, incidents involving Northern pastoralists are now magnified. Previously localized cattle raids can now become international incidents; every pastoralist carrying a weapon now is a potential militia member. As the stakes have increased along the border, so too have suspicions; Northern pastoralists are often seen as representatives of the Sudanese government, and are treated accordingly by Southern host communities, who were displaced and attacked during the civil war [...]

Sudan has also instrumentalized border communities. Continuing a tactic of the second civil war, Sudan has sponsored militias consisting of both Northern pastoralists and dissident Southern groups. These militias attempt to grab land and resources for Sudan, and fuel tensions within South Sudan. Following South Sudan’s independence, Sudan’s sponsorship of militias aims to exploit existing tensions within the nascent state, with a view to breaking it up.¹¹²

A working paper authored by Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed of the Women, Gender and Development Institute, Ahfad University of Women, Sudan, and published by the CHR. Michelsen Institute¹¹³ in 2014 provides the following background account on the importance of cattle and the role of livestock in the Sudanese context, particularly amongst pastoralists:

Livestock has many uses – domestic, social, political, and economic – that impact the social life of pastoralists in Sudan [...]

Livestock is seen, by its owners, as “money-on-hooves” or as the Baggara of Kordofan call it *Elfadha um sof* (silver that has wool). The best description is perhaps offered by Cunnison in his book “Baggara Arabs: Power and the Lineage in a Sudanese Nomad Tribe” where he writes that “among the Humr, as elsewhere, wealth is one road to prestige, power, and political position. Here perhaps the main road. Humr keep most of their wealth in cattle: a man is wealthy only when he has cattle in camp to prove it. The drive to obtain cattle, and to keep them, dominates his life” (1966, 28). Things have remained more or less the same since Cunnison made these statements. Fighting and cattle rustling between the Baggara and the Dinka in the Abyei area have always been related to such values.

Among pastoral groups livestock used to be, and still is, considered as the major part of the payment of a bride’s wealth. Today, goods handed over on such occasions may vary, but their basic component is livestock. Livestock is also the main source of cash, which is used to settle taxes, as compensation in cases of great physical harm made to others, and sometimes as a bribe to officials, especially by those seeking positions of authority such as Nazirs (present day Amirs), shaykhs or omdas. Another important element in having large herds is that they strengthen group solidarity by allowing, for example, those who have large herds to lend some animals to those who have smaller herds or no herd at all, or to those who lost theirs due to drought or epidemics and civil wars in order to keep them moving with the group.¹¹⁴

The same source further reported on cattle-stealing practices in general and specific to South

¹¹² Joshua Craze, [Dividing lines: Grazing and conflict along the Sudan-South Sudan border](#), July 2013, Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, *Conclusion*

¹¹³ See footnote 56 for further information on the CHR. Michelsen Institute (CMI).

¹¹⁴ Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed, [The social uses of livestock among pastoralists in Sudan: Food systems, stores of value, wealth, power, and authority](#), 2014, CHR. Michelsen Institute (CMI), Sudan Working Paper 2014:2, *Uses of livestock among pastoralists in Sudan*

Kordofan as follows:

However, the mutating political situation in the country has forced some changes in the symbiotic relations between villagers and pastoralists as well as in the relations within the pastoral ethnic group itself. Cattle rustling in areas where security is lacking has become conspicuous, while cooperation over grazing and watering has been overtaken by hired labor. [...]

Cattle rustling has increased with the wars in the southern part of the Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and Southern Darfur. Both the fighting forces and pastoralists take part in it. While the fighting forces need livestock to feed their members, pastoralists want to augment their herds for social and economic purposes. The appropriation of land by the state, the expansion of authorized and unauthorized semimechanized schemes, and the takeover of significant land areas by international oil companies and Arab agricultural investors, together with the civil wars, have squeezed the pastoral groups in the Sudan savannah belt forcing some to settle.¹¹⁵

According to Famine Early Warning Systems (FEWS NET) Food Security Outlook Update for September 2015 as published in the UN OCHA's 'Humanitarian Bulletin' published in October 2015 found that "There is also less and poorer quality pastureland available than usual this year [2015 in Sudan] and as a result, livestock are already being migrated southward towards agricultural land in Gedaref, El Gezira, Kassala, and Sennar states, a migration that usually takes place only in December/January, with livestock typically arriving during or just after the harvest period. As crops are in an earlier stage of development, there is a higher risk of crops being accidentally destroyed or consumed by livestock giving rise to possible risks of conflict between farmers and pastoralists".¹¹⁶

The risk of conflict due to changes in the quality of pastureland was also reported on in the February 2016 published report by the joint UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, World Food Programme, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations report as follows:

There is also an unusually low availability of good-quality pasture and forage in wet-season grazing areas across the country for this time of year. Pasture and water will be less available than usual from now until June 2016. Lack of pasture prompted early livestock migration to dry-season grazing areas in southern parts of the country in August and September 2015, instead of in October and November 2015 when this migration normally takes place. This has caused crop destruction due to reasons including the use of different migratory routes that has led to livestock intruding on agricultural land, increased resource-based tensions between farmers and cattle herders and among cattle herders over access to grazing. These tensions could intensify over the driest months from March to May 2016. There are already indications of rising tensions reported across Darfur over early migration and crop destruction by camels and cattle.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed, [*The social uses of livestock among pastoralists in Sudan: Food systems, stores of value, wealth, power, and authority*](#), 2014, CHR. Michelsen Institute (CMI), Sudan Working Paper 2014:2, *Uses of livestock among pastoralists in Sudan and Challenges and opportunities*

¹¹⁶ UN OCHA - UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, [*Humanitarian Bulletin; Sudan; Issue 41: 5 - 11 October 2015*](#), 11 October 2015, *FEWS NET: improved rains have led to the planting of up to 65% of rain-fed areas in Sudan*

¹¹⁷ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, World Food Programme, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, [*Sudan: El Niño Mitigation and Preparedness Plan*](#), 22 February 2016

a. West and South Kordofan

UN OCHA reported in early 2016 that “Government-allied militias in West and South Kordofan were involved in cattle raiding against local populations”.¹¹⁸

b. West Kordofan

1 June – 31 December 2014

In its September 2014 ‘Conflict Trends’ analysis the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) reported that

Inter-ethnic violence has been increasing steadily since early 2014, often linked to conflict over land and cattle. Clashes have involved Rizaygat, Maaliya, Hamar, Misseriya, Abala, Bani Hussein, and other groups in Darfur and West Kordofan [...]

Reconciliation efforts have targeted specific groups, although intersecting ethnic and tribal dynamics may impede their effectiveness.¹¹⁹

Agence France-Presse reported in July 2014 that “battles’ between the Hamar and Ma’aliya groups “armed with machineguns and rocket-propelled grenades have left up to 22 people dead in a border region of Darfur”, with unrest spilling into adjacent West Kordofan state, “because some cows were stolen’ said a Hamar tribal leader”.¹²⁰

2015

At the end of January 2015, Radio Tamazuj reported that “At least two herders from the Misseriya Arab tribe have been killed in fresh clashes with the Rizeigat nomadic tribe at El Gardaya southwest of El Meiram town in West Kordofan state, a Misseriya leader said. Suleiman El Sharif told Radio Tamazuj that elements from the Rizeigat tribe attacked their cattle camp killing two herders and five cows. He denied claims by members of the Rizeigat tribe that the two victims were cattle raiders”.¹²¹

In February 2015 Radio Tamazuj reported that:

Local sources have reported fresh inter-communal clashes [...] in the border area between South Sudan’s Unity state and West Kordofan state in Sudan. The clashes reportedly involve the pastoralist Arab tribe of the Misseriya and the Nuer tribe.

Mohamed Adam Wad Abuk, a Misseriya tribal leader, told Radio Tamazuj that a group of cattle raiders from the Nuer tribe in Unity state came and took cattle from them, prompting fierce fighting between the two tribes.

He confirmed that the attack resulted in the killing of several people from the two sides. But he did not know the number of casualties during those clashes.

Wad Abuk pointed out that they managed to recover the cattle. Radio Tamazuj could not independently verify the claims.¹²²

¹¹⁸ UN OCHA - UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, [Regional Outlook for the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region; Recommendations for Humanitarian Action and Resilience Response; April - June 2016](#), 2016, *Inter-communal violence*

¹¹⁹ Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), [Conflict Trends \(No. 30\), Real-time analysis of African political violence](#), September 2014, *Sudan*

¹²⁰ Agence France-Presse, [Sudan tribal militia battles kill up to 22](#), 2 July 2014

¹²¹ Radio Tamazuj, [Sudan: Two Misseriya tribesmen killed southwest of Meiram](#), 28 January 2015

¹²² Radio Tamazuj, [Nuer, Misseriya clash over cattle along Unity-Sudan border](#), 12 February 2015

At the end of February 2015, Radio Tamazuj noted that “dozens of cattle’ raided by the Midderiya herdsmen in West Kordofan have been returned after being recovered in Bul Nuer territory of northwest Unity State.”¹²³ The same source further noted that:

Mayom County Commissioner John Bol said that the cattle were raided from the Misseriya Awlad Umran tribe by a ‘small number of criminals’ hailing from both his county and neighboring Rubkona County on 9 February [2015]. The commissioner told Radio Tamazuj that he sent back 86 head of cattle after a delegation of Misseriya visited Mayom to discuss the issue.

On the other side, Hamdi Al Dodo, one of the emirs of the Misseriya tribe, confirmed that 70 to 80 cows have been returned to the Misseriya from Unity State, while stressing that the raiders had actually taken a far larger number of cattle that have still not been returned.

He said the returned cattle had been taken in a raid earlier this month in which 13 herders of the Misseriya Awlad Umran were reported killed in the Al-Dihin area, which is located east of Abyei and north of Unity State.

Speaking to Radio Tamazuj today, Hamdi claimed that more than 2,500 head of cattle were taken by the raiders from Al-Dihin area, while also denying that the perpetrators were common criminals.

Instead, he said, the raiders are affiliated with the armed forces of South Sudan. The raiding party consisted of as many as 80 men, he noted [...]

The emir also reported that another cattle raid took place earlier this month against the Misseriya Mazagna, at a place called Khashkash. He said 450 cattle were taken in that raid”.¹²⁴

In April 2015 Radio Tamazuj reported further that “Local authorities in Mayom County Commissioner in South Sudan’s Unity State have yesterday recovered 53 head of cattle looted by some Nuer criminals from the Misseriya Arab nomadic tribe in Sudan’s West Kordofan State [...] The cattle were looted by criminals from Mayom County on 15 March [2015], according to the official”.¹²⁵

In July 2015 Radio Dabanga reported that the West Kordofan Security Committee discussed a proposed schedule for the migration of nomads with their livestock, to prevent tribal clashes in the area.¹²⁶

1 January – 15 August 2016

In March 2016 Radio Tamazuj reported that “Five members of the pastoralist Misseriya Arab tribe were killed and six others injured in an attack [...] on an area south of the oil-producing Heglig area in Sudan’s West Kordofan State. Saleh Juma, a leader of the Misseriya tribe, told Radio Tamazuj that “A group of SPLA and armed groups from there attacked us in ‘Electricity’ in West Kordofan... and killed five people and wounded six and took their cattle”.¹²⁷

Radio Dabanga reported that in April 2016 “18 people were reportedly killed and wounded in the Shagel Jamainiya area of El Nahud locality in West Kordofan in clashes between Jamainiya and Sabeh clans of the Hamar tribe. The clash came against the backdrop of alleged cattle rustling”.¹²⁸

In May 2016 Radio Dabanga reported on a “A five-hour gun battle [...] between tribal clans northeast of El Nahud in West Kordofan” which “left 38 dead and many wounded”.¹²⁹ The same source stated

¹²³ Radio Tamazuj, [Nuer return dozens of stolen cattle to Sudan’s Misseriya](#), 26 February 2015

¹²⁴ Radio Tamazuj, [Nuer return dozens of stolen cattle to Sudan’s Misseriya](#), 26 February 2015

¹²⁵ Radio Tamazuj, [Mayom authorities return stolen cows to Misseriya owners](#), 2 April 2015

¹²⁶ Radio Dabanga, [West Kordofan to secure nomad movement](#), 27 July 2015

¹²⁷ Radio Tamazuj, [5 herders killed in attack near Heglig in West Kordofan](#), 9 March 2016

¹²⁸ Radio Dabanga, [Dead, injured in Darfur robberies](#), 21 April 2016

¹²⁹ Radio Dabanga, [38 dead in West Kordofan tribal clash](#), 19 May 2016

that “Witnesses told Radio Dabanga that the clashes erupted [...] after the killing of eight people from both parties in disputes over cattle” the previous week.¹³⁰ Similarly, Radio Tamazuj reported that the inter-communal clashes between two clans from Al-Hammer tribe were “reportedly over cattle raid of al-Jammanea by Awlad Subaih month [sic] ago”.¹³¹ The Radio Dabanga article further stated that the chairman of the Legislative Council of West Kordofan, Sharif Mohammad Abbad, reportedly said that “the area needs sufficient forces to collect weapons from the citizens”, supposedly suggesting that this was not happening.¹³² Yet, the article did mention that the Governor of West Kordofan, Abul Hasim said that “the army and the police intervened and contained the situation”.¹³³ However, reportedly the Editor in Chief of Al-Zajel online newspaper in Al-Nuhod town “called on the authorities to send forces to stop the clashes and calm down the situation, claiming the clashes occurred due to absence of peaceful coexistence and reconciliation conferences in the area” according to the Radio Tamazuj article.¹³⁴

Radio Dabanga reported in June 2016 that “People in West Kordofan’s El Sunut locality suffer from a shortage in drinking water, causing friction between pastoralists and residents”.¹³⁵ According to the same source, the Commissioner of Abu Zabad in West Kordofan, Hamida Mohamed Ismail, stated that this is having a “considerable impact on the agriculture and livestock, causing differences between tribes and farmers”.

c. South Kordofan

The International Refugee Rights Initiative noted in its report on civilian perspectives on the conflict in South Kordofan that “the GoS [Government of Sudan] has for years played on internal communal conflicts within SK [South Kordofan] over access to land, water and cattle, to create or inflame antagonisms between African and Arabic groupings”.¹³⁶ The same source further stated “Without a doubt, the war has had a terrible impact on civilians living in SK [South Kordofan]. As stated above, one of the main characteristics of the war has been the targeting of civilians and civilian assets, including schools, medical facilities, churches, livestock, farms and homes”.¹³⁷

1 June – 31 December 2014

In December 2014 Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that refugees that fled Darfur and Southern Kordofan “attributed most of the abuses [they experienced] to Sudanese forces, including its Rapid Support Force (RSF), a new security force under the command of Sudanese National Intelligence and Security Services. The RSF has carried out attacks on civilians in Darfur and Southern Kordofan over the last year. Many of the refugees also described rapes, killings, harassment, and cattle theft by a militia drawn from the Fellata – a nomadic ethnic group whose members the Sudanese government has recruited into auxiliary forces since conflict erupted in Blue Nile”.¹³⁸

¹³⁰ Radio Dabanga, [38 dead in West Kordofan tribal clash](#), 19 May 2016

¹³¹ Radio Tamazuj, [37 killed in clashes between Al-Hammer clans in West Kordofan](#), 20 May 2016

¹³² Radio Dabanga, [38 dead in West Kordofan tribal clash](#), 19 May 2016

¹³³ Radio Dabanga, [38 dead in West Kordofan tribal clash](#), 19 May 2016

¹³⁴ Radio Tamazuj, [37 killed in clashes between Al-Hammer clans in West Kordofan](#), 20 May 2016

¹³⁵ Radio Dabanga, [‘Friction’ over West Kordofan water shortage](#), 14 June 2016

¹³⁶ International Refugee Rights Initiative, [“We just want a rest from war” - Civilian perspectives on the conflict in Sudan’s Southern Kordofan State](#), April 2015, *Background*

¹³⁷ International Refugee Rights Initiative, [“We just want a rest from war” - Civilian perspectives on the conflict in Sudan’s Southern Kordofan State](#), April 2015, *The realities of war, Victims of a brutal war*

¹³⁸ Human Rights Watch (HRW), [Sudan: Soldiers, Militias Killing, Raping Civilians, Urgent Need for UN, AU Investigation in Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan](#), 14 December 2014

2015

In January 2015 the Sudan Consortium reported that “there was an incident of looting in Um Dorein County. In the words of one witness ‘[w]e werethree herders grazing in the village side when the militiagroup of three persons ambushed us. Myself and anotherherder ran. They chased us but we managed to escape.However, the third herder remained and they have takenhim with all the livestock (40 goats and 3 sheep)’”¹³⁹.

The Sudan Consortium reported in February 2015 that “Monitors in Lagawa County reported a looting incident in Al Sonut village. On 7 February [2015], assailants believed to be soldiers of the government of Sudan, killed a man who was takinghis cows out to graze. The attackers took all of his possessions and fled. The attackers also abductedtwo boys who were herding cattle and stole their livestock”¹⁴⁰.

In March 2015 the UN OCHA ‘Humanitarian Bulletin’ reported that people fled Habila town on 28th March 2015 due to fighting between government forces and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), during which “morethan 300 homes were burned down, affecting some 2,240 people. An additional 5,500people reportedly lost all their food supplies and livestock, which were either looted, burned or destroyed”¹⁴¹.

In July 2015 the UN OCHA ‘Humanitarian Bulletin’ reported that heavy rains and floods that have damaged homes in South Kordofan further compromised their situation with regards to the deterioration of food security: “The worsening food security situation stems from conflict-related insecurity,which has led to drastic declines in agricultural production and a rising incidence of cattleraidsthroughout the state, where nearly 70 per cent of households rely on livestock salesfor income”¹⁴².

Radio Tamazuj reported at the end of July 2015 that “One person was reported killed and three injured [...] in an attack on a cattle camp in Al Feidh-Um Abdullah area of Sudan’s South Kordofan state.Local citizens told Radio Tamazuj the perpetrators came from the western mountains. Police have yet to arrest the criminals”¹⁴³.

In July 2015 the Sudan Social Development Organisation (SUDO) reported that “SPLM-N forces, based in Jebel Al-Bedeiryia [...] attacked a group of nomads from the Awlad Gaboush ethnic group (a sub-ethnic group from the Hawazma) heading north as part of their migration away from the south due to the onset of the rainy season.Following the attack the SPLM-N soldiers looted 350 cows from the victims, after which a separate group from Awlad Gaboush tried to rescue the looted cows. The SPLM-N soldiers fired upon the rescue party killing Fadlalla Mohamed, who is aged 52 and married to two wives and has 11 children.The situation remains tense between the Hawazma and the Nuba ethnic groups. The Hawazma view such attacks as a consorted effort to force Arab ethnic groups

¹³⁹ Sudan Consortium, [Human Rights Update 1: December 2014 – January 2015](#), January 2015

¹⁴⁰ Sudan Consortium, [Human Rights Update: February - March 2015](#), March 2015

¹⁴¹ UN OCHA - UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, [Humanitarian Bulletin; Sudan; Issue 14; 30 March - 5 April 2015](#), 5 April 2015, *HAC says almost all people displaced from South Kordofan’s Habila town have returned*

¹⁴² UN OCHA - UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, [Humanitarian Bulletin; Sudan; Issue 29; 13 - 19 July 2015](#), 19 July 2015, *Heavy rains affect some 600 people in S. Kordofan*

¹⁴³ Radio Tamazuj, [1 dead in South Kordofan raid](#), 28 July 2015

away from South Kordofan, whilst the Nuba blame the Hawazma, and other Arab ethnic groups, for colluding with the Government's attempts to cleanse South Kordofan of Nuba".¹⁴⁴

In August 2015 the Sudan Social Development Organisation (SUDO) reported that "A group of SPLM-N soldiers attacked a number of traders who were returning to their home in Abasiya Town after finishing at Al-Jabel market between Rashad and Abasiya. The soldiers looted 60 cows, which belonged to the trader El-Haj Al-Toum. The traders informed the army garrison based in Al-Migrih who drove off the SPLM-N force and recovered 12 of the stolen cows".¹⁴⁵

In October 2015 the South Kordofan and Blue Nile Coordination Unit reported that "government forces attempted to raid cattle in Tamo village (Abri payam, Dalami county) - 2 km from the front-line. Residents responded to the fire, and four cows were injured in the cross-fire".¹⁴⁶

The Sudan Social Development Organisation (SUDO) reported in October 2015 on the increasing tension between farmers and nomads in South Kordofan:

Nomads in South Kordofan are increasingly grazing their cattle on farm land at the end of the day as farmers leave to return to their homes. In one incident a farmer caught a nomad with livestock on his farm and went to slaughter one of the trespassers cows. Fortunately he was stopped by a neighbour who took the nomad and his cattle to the police. The situation was resolved by the nomad paying the cost of the damage inflicted on the farmer's land by his livestock. He was also warned against returning to the farms.

The following morning the farmers returned to their farms, which had been devastated by grazing livestock during the night. The farmers complained to the police who failed to file a case in spite of the farmers and the police both knowing the identities of the perpetrators. Consequently the farmers have lost their seasonal harvest and their annual income.

In this case and many others such acts are committed by perpetrators acting under impunity, thus only works to perpetuate a cycle of retaliation possibly leading to the outbreak of further conflict.¹⁴⁷

In November 2015 the Sudan Social Development Organisation (SUDO) reported that "monitors reported an attack by the SPLM-N on Um Olwan village situated north-west of Delling in Delling Locality. The attack is the consequence of inflaming tensions and escalating incidents between members from the Hawazma ethnic group and the local garrison in question. The Hawazma from this particular village had attacked the SPLM-N camp previously killing two soldiers in response to the SPLM-N having earlier looted their cattle. This led the SPLM-N to attack the village in question killing civilians including women and children. As of yet the death count is unclear but constitutes members from both sides. Seven persons have been rushed to Delling hospital, whilst four shops in the village were looted, 100 cows stolen and farms destroyed".¹⁴⁸

In December 2015 the South Kordofan and Blue Nile Coordination Unit reported that "Cattle raiding has increased in frequency and magnitude in South Kordofan during this period, purportedly by government-sponsored militias. In particular in the Western Jebels, in Dilling county, according to

¹⁴⁴ Sudan Social Development Organisation (SUDO), [HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN SUDAN OVER THE MONTH OF JULY 2015](#), 1 August 2015, *South Kordofan*

¹⁴⁵ Sudan Social Development Organisation (SUDO), [HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN SUDAN OVER THE MONTH OF AUGUST 2015](#), 1 September 2015, *South Kordofan*

¹⁴⁶ South Kordofan and Blue Nile Coordination Unit, [Humanitarian Update – October 2015, South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, Sudan](#), October 2015, *South Kordofan, A. Protection, Insecurity and Displacement*

¹⁴⁷ Sudan Social Development Organisation (SUDO), [HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN SUDAN OVER THE MONTH OF OCTOBER 2015](#), 1 November 2015, *South Kordofan*

¹⁴⁸ Sudan Social Development Organisation (SUDO), [HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN SUDAN OVER THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER 2015](#), 21 December 2015, *South Kordofan*

humanitarian monitors several incidents of cattle raiding are creating fear amongst local residents, who are unable to access their far farms. On December 13th, 170 animals, including goats, cows and donkeys, were stolen from Ngitile, Kakara, Forse, Hejerat and Kulerge villages. On the 17th of December, 11 goats were stolen in Juguba village by government-supported militias. In Adlan village, a civilian was killed in his farm by government-supported militias on December 20th. On December 21st, a militia group suspected to be sponsored by the Sudan government attacked a group of pastoralists in Abusonoun village, Meri payam, Western Kadugli area. Two people were killed during the attack, and 25 heads of cattle were looted. On December 24th, 109 heads of cattle were taken from two households, with no human casualties".¹⁴⁹

1 January – 15 August 2016

In January 2016 the South Kordofan and Blue Nile Coordination Unit reported that "Cattle raiding in [South Kordofan] occurred at a much smaller scale than in December 2015. However, it remains impactful as livestock forms the only source of income for some households, after losing most of their farmland due to insecurity, and with minimum coping mechanisms after five years of conflict. On 7 January PDF [Popular Democratic Front] allegedly looted 19 goats from two households in Tessay payam. On 16 January, in Dilling county, 68 heads of cattle belonging to 3 households were looted from Karkando village by government-supported militias. On 24 January, in Alazraq of Heiban county, PDF reportedly looted 22 cows from one household".¹⁵⁰

Radio Tamazuj reported in May 2016 that "Citizens in Dilling locality of Sudan's South Kordofan state told Radio Tamazuj a group of gunmen driving land cruisers attacked camel herders from the Maalia tribe about 3 kilometers from al-Farshaya. They added that 90 camels were raided, accusing elements from the SPLA-North rebels of being behind this attack".¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁹ South Kordofan and Blue Nile Coordination Unit, [Humanitarian Update – December 2015, South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, Sudan](#), December 2015, South Kordofan, A. Protection, Insecurity and Displacement

¹⁵⁰ South Kordofan and Blue Nile Coordination Unit, [Humanitarian Update - January 2016, South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, Sudan](#), January 2016, South Kordofan, A. Protection, Insecurity and Displacement

¹⁵¹ Radio Tamazuj, [Gunmen raid 90 camels in al-Farshaya in Sudan's South Kordofan](#), 9 May 2016

C. The ability of the State authorities to prevent and protect victims or would-be victims in West and South Kordofan

The United States Institute of Peace found in May 2014 that in relation to cattle raiding “Sudan and South Sudan have theoretically been at peace since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in 2005, yet local and intercommunal violence continues seemingly unabated. Local conflicts related to cattle raids and grazing rights and persistent national conflicts are inextricably linked in Sudan and South Sudan, complicating efforts to reduce violence and build sustainable peace. Local peace actors undertake peace initiatives, turning to international organizations for funding and logistical support for peace conferences. Many of these peace conferences fail to produce lasting resolution to local conflicts.”¹⁵²

Following the clashes in June 2014 between the al-Zyoud and Awlad Omran clans, Radio Dabanga reported that El Ziyoud Omda, Yousif Yagoub, told Radio Dabanga that “his clan [the Awlad Omran] has withdrawn from the ruling National Congress Party, ‘because the government is ignoring tribal conflicts’. He accused some ‘high-ranking officials within the regime’ of profiting from the tribal conflicts in the region”.¹⁵³ The same source further stated that Misseriya sheikh Mohamed Wad Abuk held the “local authorities and the West Kordofan State government responsible for the outbreak of the clashes”.¹⁵⁴ The Sudan Tribune reported “the government deployed police and military troops to contain the situation amid widespread of weapons among tribesmen” during clashes in June 2014.¹⁵⁵

In November 2014 Al-Arabyia (English) reported on several days of fighting between the al-Zyoud and Awlad Omran clans and quoted Mokhtar Babo Nimir, leader of the Misseriya tribe, as stating “Until this evening there are no government troops on the ground to separate the fighters and more than 100 have been killed from both sides”.¹⁵⁶ The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA) reported on the same clashes that “the clashes that occurred some 50km southeast of Nyama were stopped when Government security forces deployed to the area to restore peace between the two communities on 30 November [2014]”.¹⁵⁷

The U.S. Department of State reported in its annual report covering 2015 about the government’s efforts with regards to intertribal conflicts and found that “Civilian authorities generally maintained control of police and other security forces but failed to prevent societal violence. The government attempted to respond to some interethnic fighting but was not effective in mediating peaceful solutions”.¹⁵⁸

In March 2015, Radio Tamazuj reported about renewed clashes between the al-Zyoud and Awlad Omran clans “at Kilo 13 area in West Kordofan State” and quoted an al-Zyoud leader as claiming that the security situation had returned to normal after the Rapid Support Forces intervened.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵² United States Institute of Peace, [Local peace processes in Sudan and South Sudan](#), May 2014, *Summary*

¹⁵³ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan's Misseriya clans clash again in West Kordofan](#), 29 June 2014

¹⁵⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan's Misseriya clans clash again in West Kordofan](#), 29 June 2014

¹⁵⁵ Sudan Tribune, [Sudanese presidency orders end to tribal fighting in West Kordofan](#), 18 August 2014

¹⁵⁶ Al-Arabya, [Over 100 dead in clashes in Sudan's Kordofan: tribes](#), 28 November 2014

¹⁵⁷ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), [Humanitarian Bulletin; Sudan; Issue 48; 24-30 November 2014](#), 30 November 2014

¹⁵⁸ United States Department of State, [Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015: Sudan](#), 13 April 2016, *1.d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention, Role of the Police and Security Apparatus*

¹⁵⁹ Radio Tamazuj, [Sudan: Fresh clashes between feuding clans in West Kordofan](#), 23 March 2015

In July 2015, Radio Dabanga reported that

the West Kordofan Security Committee discussed a proposed schedule for the migration of nomads with their livestock, to prevent tribal clashes in the area. Brig. Abdallatif Abdallah Abdelgader, commander of the 22st Infantry Brigade, stressed in a meeting of the Security Committee in El Fula, capital of West Kordofan, that all herders are required to commit themselves to the schedule. The brigadier stressed that “there is no room for outlaws in West Kordofan anymore”, pointing to the security measures recently imposed in the state. The West Kordofan governor, Abulgasem El Amin Baraka, headed the meeting in which the leader of the Awlad Umran tribe, Ismail Hamedein, presented his recommendations to prevent new tribal conflicts over pastures in the south-western part of Sudan. Last month [June 2015], the leaders of the Awlad Umran met in Abyei locality, where they discussed the issue of repeated conflicts over pastures, formulated a number of recommendations, and renewed their commitment to the peace agreement with the Zuyoud tribe.¹⁶⁰

Radio Dabanga reported in October 2015 that Sudan’s military Chief of Staff, Major-General Imad Adawi was concerned “about the spread of tribal disputes, the reluctance of the youth for military recruitment, and the low efficiency of the armed forces. ‘The army might turn into state pockets and lose nationalism, as has happened to the police’”.¹⁶¹ According to the Undersecretary of the Federal Governance Bureau, tribalism and regionalism have “greatly impacted the work of the armed forces because of the penetration of tribalism within the armed forces. The power of the tribe has become far greater than some might imagine, as some of the decisions have been issued to satisfy certain tribal orientations”.¹⁶²

In November 2015, Radio Tamazuj reported that Sudanese security forces had arrested 29 people from the al-Zyoud and Awlad Omran clans on charges of trespassing delineated corridors for the two tribes after clashes erupted between the two feuding tribes.¹⁶³

The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) stated in January 2016 that “Current national peace processes have largely neglected communal violence, despite its prevalence and intensity”.¹⁶⁴

The CHR. Michelsen Institute¹⁶⁵ published in April 2016 a report looking at the Sudan Armed Forces and found that “After the 2015 elections, most governors and ministers, however, have proven to have a security background and seem to be more concerned with the insecurity of the leadership than with curbing the expansion of tribal-ethnic conflicts”.¹⁶⁶

With regards to whether the state could provide protection against individuals caught in inter-communal violence, Dr Harry Verhoeven, country expert on Sudan, stated that the Sudanese government could indeed potentially protect more of its people but has historically been unwilling to do much, certainly not for ethno-regional groups with which it has troubled political relations. Today, in addition to this historical problem of protection because of faltering will, is the reality of the increased withering of the state and a growing incapacity, even if it wants to protect, to ensure

¹⁶⁰ Radio Dabanga, [West Kordofan to secure nomad movement](#), 27 July 2015

¹⁶¹ Radio Dabanga, [‘Tribalism a challenge for Sudan army’: military chief](#), 27 October 2015

¹⁶² Radio Dabanga, [‘Tribalism a challenge for Sudan army’: military chief](#), 27 October 2015

¹⁶³ Radio Tamazuj, [Mediation committee calls for release of arrested Misseriya in W Kordofan](#), 24 November 2015

¹⁶⁴ Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, [Country Report: Sudan and South Sudan](#), January 2015, *Communal violence*

¹⁶⁵ See footnote 56 for further information on the CHR. Michelsen Institute (CMI).

¹⁶⁶ CHR. Michelsen Institute, [The Sudan Armed Forces and Prospects of Change](#), April 2016, page 5

the full rights of its citizens, including their physical integrity”.¹⁶⁷ He further noted that historically the Sudanese government was in a position to protect its citizens if it chooses to do so, but that today the situation is more complicated as the Sudanese government has lost “a lot of its cohesion and lost part of its territorial control and resources. Therefore it outsources protection to non-state actors including the Misseriya”.¹⁶⁸

In email correspondence with ARC, Douglas H. Johnson, country expert on Sudan, wrote on 8th August 2016 that “The cumulative effect of government policies in alienating land for mechanised farming schemes, the location of oil industry installations along grazing routes, and the failure to resolve the Abyei issue all have a bearing on why the Misseriya blame the [Sudanese] government for contributing to their internal feuds, and why state authorities themselves are part of the problem and unlikely to be reliable protectors of civilians”.¹⁶⁹

Jago Salmon, country expert on Sudan in a telephone interview with ARC on 10th August 2016, responded that “formal [protection] systems don’t work” and “protection as such does not exist”.¹⁷⁰ He explained that whilst the Sudanese government always had some interest in resolving inter-communal violence when it flared up, it rarely got involved unless it “really escalated or spilled over” and such interventions were complicated as the government enjoyed a powerful support-base in West Kordofan.¹⁷¹ Even when local village elders were predicting such violence due to forthcoming environmental and structural factors [see for more information section ‘[A. Inter-communal violence in West Kordofan](#)’ further above], “no one” was responding.¹⁷² The same expert further noted that practical factors such as non-existent roads, urban policing but not rural [“policing is an urban thing. Policing rurally is practically impossible”] also prevented the Sudanese government from intervening when violence flared up.¹⁷³ Traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms had largely collapsed over 30 years ago and local traditional leaders and elders are no longer in control, stated Jago Salmon, and added that whilst attempts to build local solutions and resurrect traditional mediation/conflict resolution mechanisms were important these were often ineffective, with the national government not “really able to help”.¹⁷⁴

In a telephone conversation with ARC on 15th August 2016, a country expert on Sudan who wants to remain anonymous, noted that whilst attempts have and continue to be made by the government to end the inter-communal violence in the form of reconciliatory conferences, they were poorly implemented and “largely ineffective”.¹⁷⁵

¹⁶⁷Dr Harry Verhoeven, country expert on Sudan in a telephone interview with Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC) on 19th July 2016. See Annex A for more information.

¹⁶⁸Dr Harry Verhoeven, country expert on Sudan in a telephone interview with Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC) on 19th July 2016. See Annex A for more information.

¹⁶⁹Douglas H. Johnson, country expert on Sudan in email correspondence with Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC) on 8th August 2016. See Annex A for more information.

¹⁷⁰Jago Salmon, country expert on Sudan in a telephone interview with Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC) on 10th August 2016. See Annex A for more information.

¹⁷¹Jago Salmon, country expert on Sudan in a telephone interview with Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC) on 10th August 2016. See Annex A for more information.

¹⁷²Jago Salmon, country expert on Sudan in a telephone interview with Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC) on 10th August 2016. See Annex A for more information.

¹⁷³Jago Salmon, country expert on Sudan in a telephone interview with Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC) on 10th August 2016. See Annex A for more information.

¹⁷⁴Jago Salmon, country expert on Sudan in a telephone interview with Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC) on 10th August 2016. See Annex A for more information.

¹⁷⁵Anonymous, country expert on Sudan in a telephone interview with Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC) on 15th August 2016. See Annex A for more information.

Abdel-Rahman El-Mahdi, a country expert on Sudan, in providing written comments on 28th August 2016 commented that:

The state authorities have been unable to quell the violence in Western Kordofan.

In 2014 army forces stationed in the region failed to intervene to stop a battle that raged between rival clans in Nyama area and in which 300 were killed. Protection to civilians by state authorities is extremely lacking in West Kordofan especially in the rural areas outside the main towns. The state also lacks the capacity to provide any such protection and is struggling to curb the proliferation and spread of small arms. The brokering of peace agreements by the state authorities at times has also been a trigger for more conflict between the sub-clans of the Misseriya tribe, where outcomes from the peace arrangements failed to gain acceptance by the communities at the grassroots.¹⁷⁶

In a telephone conversation with ARC on 15th August 2016, a country expert on Sudan who wants to remain anonymous further added that these local initiatives sometimes worked, but sometimes did not especially when the 'blood money' (restitution) that was set for the lost/killed cattle was too high and therefore did not act as a deterrent.¹⁷⁷ With regards to actual protection, the country expert stated that Sudanese police, heavily armed, are stationed in towns but individuals fearing inter-communal violence might prefer to remain in rural areas and within their villages and tribes for protection as towns are too mixed and individuals might be and feel less safe than with their own people.¹⁷⁸ Contrarily, Jago Salmon, country expert on Sudan, stated that individuals who feared other tribes and/or have no cattle left tend to move to urban areas where some kind of protection exists and where they feel "relatively safer than out in the rural areas".¹⁷⁹

More generally, in October 2014 the Equal Rights Trust found that "While racial/ethnic discrimination is found less in law and predominantly in practice (with the exception of nationality law which discriminates explicitly on the basis of ethnicity), the chief ethnic discriminator is the state, acting through such state agents as the armed forces, the police and the security services. Their actions – and their passivity in the face of violations by private actors – in the course of the last two decades have built a culture of impunity in which discrimination thrives".¹⁸⁰

Freedom House reported in its annual report covering 2015 that "Sudan is considered one of the world's most corrupt countries, and ranked 165 of 168 countries and territories surveyed in Transparency International's 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index [...] Power and resources are concentrated in and around Khartoum, while outlying states are neglected and impoverished".¹⁸¹ The same report further noted that:

Beyond the capital and the immediate area around it, Sudan's many distinct ethnic, regional, and religious groups face political, social, and economic marginalization [...] The government has met attempted rebellions in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile with indiscriminate violence, including the bombing of civilians, targeted killings, forced displacement of communities, the burning of

¹⁷⁶ Abdel-Rahman El-Mahdi, country expert on Sudan in email correspondence with Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC) on 28th August 2016. See Annex A for more information.

¹⁷⁷ Anonymous, country expert on Sudan in a telephone interview with Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC) on 15th August 2016 and email correspondence with ARC on 14th August 2016. See Annex A for more information.

¹⁷⁸ Anonymous, country expert on Sudan in a telephone interview with Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC) on 15th August 2016. See Annex A for more information.

¹⁷⁹ Jago Salmon, country expert on Sudan in a telephone interview with Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC) on 10th August 2016. See Annex A for more information.

¹⁸⁰ Equal Rights Trust, *[In Search of Confluence" Addressing Discrimination and Inequality in Sudan](#)*, October 2014, Executive Summary

¹⁸¹ Freedom House, *[Freedom in the World 2016: Sudan](#)*, 27 January 2016, C. Functioning of Government: 1 / 12

villages, and the use of rape as a weapon of war. The executors of these activities are regular forces, supplemented by paramilitary groups under the loose authority of the NISS.¹⁸²

The Fund For Peace (FFP) 'Fragile States Index 2016' ranked Sudan at 4th place out of 178 countries measured.¹⁸³ The FFP Index is based on twelve social, economic and political indicators of which Sudan scored as follows in the 'Political and Military Indicators'¹⁸⁴:

Indicator	Description – "Includes pressures and measures related to":	Score ¹⁸⁵
State Legitimacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corruption • Government effectiveness [...] • Level of democracy [...] • Power struggles 	9.8/10
Public services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policing • Criminality [...] 	9.1/10
Human rights and rule of law	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civil liberties • Political freedoms [...] 	9.3/10
Security apparatus	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal conflict • Small arms proliferation [...] • Fatalities from conflict • Military coups • Rebel activity • Militancy • Bombings [...] 	9.2/10
Factionalised elites	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Power struggles [...] 	10/10

¹⁸² Freedom House, [Freedom in the World 2015: Sudan](#), 27 January 2016, *F. Rule of Law: 0 / 16*

¹⁸³ Fund For Peace (FFP), [Fragile States Index 2016](#), 27 June 2016

¹⁸⁴ For further information on these indicators see Fund For Peace (FFP), [The Indicators](#), undated [last accessed: 19/08/2016]

¹⁸⁵ Fund For Peace (FFP), [Fragile States Index 2016](#), 27 June 2016

Annex A: Details of country experts consulted

To supplement the publicly available information included in sections 'A. Inter-communal violence in West Kordofan' and 'C. The ability of the State authorities to prevent and protect victims or would-be victims in West and South Kordofan', country experts on Sudan were contacted between July – August 2016 by Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC) to provide their expertise, either through telephone interview or in writing, on the following two questions:

- Does the inter-communal violence in West Kordofan take on a revenge killing/retaliatory aspect?
- Is the Sudanese state able to provide protection?

The following three country experts were interviewed over the phone:

❖ **Anonymous**

Due to the nature of his work on Sudan and South Sudan as a consultant, advisor and coordinator for various organisations this country expert would prefer to keep his identity anonymous.

❖ **Jago Salmon** (jago.salmon@gmail.com)

Jago Salmon is the Advisor to the UN/World Bank Partnership in Fragile and Conflict Affected States. Jago joined the partnership from UNDP's Bureau for Policy and Programme Support where he was Manager of UNDP's regional Payment Programme for Ebola Response Workers, and the lead governance specialist working on support to Core Government Functions in the aftermath of conflict. Jago has over 10 years' experience in programme design and management in fragile and conflict affected settings, with field experience in Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, Liberia, Lebanon, Occupied Palestinian territories. Before joining the UN, Jago worked with the Small Arms Survey, International Crisis Group, the Overseas Development Institute and the UK's Department for International Development. He holds a doctorate from Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin with a dissertation on 'The Organisation of Irregular Armed Forces in Civil War' and speaks English, French, Arabic and Italian.

❖ **Dr. Harry Verhoeven** (hv89@georgetown.edu)

Professor Harry Verhoeven teaches at the School of Foreign Service in Qatar, Georgetown University. He is also an Associate Member of the Department of Politics and International Relations of the University of Oxford. His research focuses on elite politics, conflict and the political economy of the environment in Sudan, the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region. Outside academia, he has worked in Northern Uganda, Sudan, India and the Democratic Republic of Congo. He has also provided consultancy services to and collaborated with the World Bank, UNDP Sudan, Chatham House, Small Arms Survey and several governments. From October 2016 onwards, he is a Visiting Scholar at Cambridge University.

The following country experts on Sudan provided written comments:

❖ **Abdel-Rahman El-Mahdi** (arelmahdi@gmail.com)

Abdel-Rahman El-Mahdi is a professional development practitioner with over 15 years of experience in international development, anchored in NGO management and programming in Sudan, South Sudan and the Middle East. He has a strong and well-developed network across Sudan and South Sudan and is well attuned to the socio-political environment in these two countries. He is also the Managing Director of the Sudanese Development Initiative (SUDIA), a non-profit NGO working for

greater stability, development, and good governance in Sudan by reducing violence, empowering youth and advancing the role of the media and civil society.

❖ **Douglas H. Johnson** (dhjohnson49@me.com)

Douglas H. Johnson is a scholar specializing in the history of North East Africa, Sudan and South Sudan. He has served as Assistant Director for Archives in the Southern Regional Government, was a resource person in the 2003 Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement negotiations over the Three Areas (Abyei, Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile), and was a member of the Abyei Boundary Commission. He is a Fellow of the Rift Valley and the author of *Nuer Prophets: A History of Prophecy from the Upper Nile in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (1994), *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars: Peace or Truce* (2011), and *When Boundaries become Borders: the Impact of Boundary-Making in Southern Sudan's Frontier Zones* (2011).